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Magical Thinking and Trusts
Bridget J. Crawford *
At a time of monumental economic inequality in the United States,
wealthy individuals and their tax-motivated behavior have come under
significant scrutiny from all corners. In 2019, the Supreme Court issued its
first major ruling in over sixty years on the state income taxation of trusts.
In North Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Trust, the Court declined to close what some critics consider
to be a major loophole that benefits the trusts that wealthy individuals
create for family members. This Article makes two principal claims—one
interpretative and the other normative. This Article explains why the
Court’s decision in Kaestner Trust is correct as a matter of law. Just as
trusts themselves are a type of magical thinking—legal fictions made real
by law—so, too, is the hope that the judicial branch can play an active role
in limiting the use of trusts by the wealthy. Because judges cannot
disregard centuries of trust jurisprudence, critics of family trusts instead
have directed their attention mostly to the tax law. This Article suggests
that reformation of the substantive law of trusts might help achieve reform,
as well.
Through the prism of a reimagined legal landscape for trusts—by
engaging in a different exercise in magical thinking—one can differentiate
those aspects of family trusts that serve salutary legal or social purposes
from those that serve primarily to preserve and protect wealth. This
analysis has important implications for the larger cultural conversation
about trusts. Examining how trusts operate and considering what
limitations, if any, a just society might impose on them opens the way for
identifying allies in the effort to narrow the wealth gap. Reducing wealth
inequality is crucial so that all people will have some means of pursuing
their personal ideals of social, political, and economic fulfillment.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Dragons and magic beans are the stuff of fiction, not law.1 Impartial
jurors are fictional, too, because no person can be literally free from bias or
opinion.2 But the U.S. Constitution requires an impartial jury, so the law
tolerates a certain degree of wishful belief that such a thing exists.3
Similarly a corporation is an imagined entity.4 It has no corporeal presence

1
See, e.g., J.K. ROWLING, HARRY POTTER AND THE GOBLET OF FIRE (2000) (in which
the story’s title character must fight a fire-breathing, flying dragon in an inter-school
competition); JACK AND THE BEANSTALK (retold by Carol Ottolenghi, Carson Dellosa
Publishing 2002), https://tinyurl.com/y3grctq8 (in which Jack sells family cow for magic
beans).
2
The court system operates on the presumption that it is possible to seat an impartial
jury, even though cognitive bias is endemic to the human condition. As one scholar
describes it, “an impartial juror is not a completely neutral person, but is one who evidences
no extreme bias for or against the accused.” Tony M. Massaro, Peremptories or Peers?—
Rethinking Sixth Amendment Doctrine, Images, and Procedures, 64 N.C. L. REV. 501, 544
(1986) (discussing cognitive bias in the context of jury selection and the Sixth Amendment
right to an “impartial jury”).
3
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation . . . .”).
4
Elizabeth Pollman, Reconceiving Corporate Personhood, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1629,
1638–39 (2011) (“the notion of legal personality is consistent with early case law such
as . . . that recognized corporations as legal fictions having the capacities and characteristics
given to them in the corporate charter, such as “individuality”) (citations omitted).
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and owes its existence to shareholders—yet the law treats a corporation as
a “person,” bestowing on it the ability to contract, sue, make political and
charitable donations, and even exercise rights of political free speech.5
Like unbiased jurors and corporations, trusts are legal fictions made
real by the law.6 For hundreds of years7 the common law has recognized
the right of a property owner (typically known as the “grantor” or “settlor”)
to transfer property to a trustee, to hold and manage the property for the
benefit of others. In the classic private express trust context, the law treats
the trustee as the legal owner of the property and the beneficiary (or
beneficiaries) as the equitable owner(s) of the property.8 The beneficiary
5
See, e.g., id. at 1638 (historically corporations were permitted “to contract, own
property, sue and be sued in the corporate name. Specifically, the corporate ability to own
property and to sue and be sued were considered incident to the corporate form at common
law”) (citations omitted). See also 26 U.S.C. § 170(a) (2018) (income tax deduction for
charitable contributions); Kristine Cordier Karnezis, Power of Corporation to Make
Political Contribution or Expenditure Under State Law, 79 A.L.R.3d 491 (discussing
general power of corporation to make contributions for certain political purposes). In 2010,
the Supreme Court ruled that corporations have constitutional protection for their “political
speech.” Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 342 (2010) (“[P]olitical
speech does not lose First Amendment protection ‘simply because its source is a
corporation.”) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978)).
See also Robert Sprague & Mary Ellen Wells, The Supreme Court as Prometheus:
Breathing Life into the Corporate Supercitizen, 49 AM. BUS. L.J. 507, 556 (2012) (tracing
development of American law of corporations, including with regard to political speech
rights).
6
Related to, or perhaps a branch of, legal fiction are legal presumptions. For a
somewhat light-hearted look at evidentiary presumptions in South Carolina law, for
example, see Walter Moïse, Bursting Bubbles, Legal Fictions and Evidential Presumptions,
27 S.C. LAW. 16, 17 (2015) (listing presumptions such as “persons are conclusively
presumed to know the law, which includes statutes and common law;” “when a bigamous
spouse enters marriage in good faith, his or her children are conclusively presumed to be
legitimate;” and “a person is presumed to know and intend the probable and natural
consequences of his or her actions”) (citing ALEX SANDERS & JOHN S. NICHOLS, TRIAL
HANDBOOK FOR SOUTH CAROLINA LAWYERS: PRESUMPTIONS § 12 (2018)).
7
Depending on the origin story one prefers, the modern day private express trust has a
different ancestor. See, e.g., ROBERT H. SITKOFF & JESSE DUKEMINIER, WILLS, TRUSTS &
ESTATES 386 (10th ed. 2017) (“Because the [Franciscan] friars [in England] were forbidden
to own property, benefactors conveyed land to friends of the friars, to hold to the use of the
friars,” and thus the use—a precursor to the modern trust—was known in thirteenth century
England.). See also JOSHUA PRAWER, THE LATIN KINGDOM OF JERUSALEM 211 (1972)
(suggesting that Christian contact with Muslims during the Crusades was an inspiration for
the English trust); Avisheh Avini, Comment, The Origins of the Modern English Trust
Revisited, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1139, 1139 (1996) (identifying Crusades as likely point of
contact by Englishmen with Muslims and the Islamic legal system that recognized a trustlike device known as a waqf); Shael Herman, Note, Utilitas Ecclesiae: The Canonical
Conception of the Trust, 70 TUL. L. REV. 2239, 2278 (1996) (describing the Islamic waqf as
an influence on the modern trust). For an overview of the general structure of trusts see,
e.g., SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER supra, at 401 (detailing how grantors create trusts).
8
See SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER supra note 7, at 401. But see Johanna Jacques, Property
and the Interests of Things: The Case of the Donative Trust, 30 L. & CRITIQUE 201, 202–03
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may or may not have a right to receive income or principal (or both) from
the trust.9
A beneficiary’s creditors ordinarily cannot reach the
beneficiary’s interest in the trust, as long as the instrument is drafted
carefully.10 The law typically does not treat the beneficiary as the “owner”
of the trust property for tax purposes, either, as long as the property stays in
the trust and the beneficiary does not have any right to control or obtain
it.11 These legal fictions—trusts—have the force of law because the law
converts magical thinking into material reality, with duties for the trustee
and corresponding rights of beneficiaries.12
From the introduction of trusts in thirteenth-century England, trusts
have always intertwined with tax avoidance.13 That entanglement has
continued unabated into the twenty-first century.14 At a time when wealth
inequality in the United States is at staggering levels—and only
increasing—critics are drawing attention to the use (and misuse) by
wealthy individuals of private express trusts intended as alternatives to

(2019) (critiquing in context of “the kind of private donative trust that is commonly
regarded as an alternative to an outright gift” the liberal conception of property as
necessarily involving control by one or more individuals).
9
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 49 (AM. LAW. INST. 2019) (describing
multiple possible configurations of beneficial interests).
10
See id. at § 60 (Transfer or Attachment of Discretionary Interest).
11
But see, e.g., 26 U.S.C. §§ 2041(a) (2018) (estate tax inclusion of property over
which beneficiary has general power of appointment); 2056(b)(5) (estate tax inclusion of
trust in which spouse beneficiary had life estate with power of appointment). See also
Robert T. Danforth, A Proposal for Integrating the Income and Transfer Taxation of Trusts,
18 VA. TAX REV. 545 (1999) (providing an overview of relationship between income
taxation of trusts and the wealth transfer tax system); Joseph M. Dodge, Simplifying Models
for the Income Taxation of Trusts and Estates, 14 AM. J. TAX POL’Y 127, 137–42 (1997)
(describing general structure of income tax rules applicable to trusts).
12
See, e.g., UNIF. TRUST CODE §§ 801 (trustee’s duty to administer trust), 802 (trustee’s
duty of loyalty), 803 (trustee’s duty of impartiality), 804 (trustee’s duty of prudent
administration), 813 (right of beneficiaries to receive certain information about the trust),
1002 (right of beneficiary to receive damages for breach of trust) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2000). See also David M. English, The Uniform Trust Code (2000): Significant Provisions
and Policy Issues, 67 MO. L. REV. 143 (2002).
13
See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Less Trust Means More Trusts, 75 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. ONLINE 74, 79–80 (2019) (describing trusts as way of avoiding feudal incidents or
restrictions on property ownership by certain groups or individuals).
14
See, e.g., Alyssa A. DiRusso, Pro and Con (Law): Considering the Irrevocable
Nongrantor Trust Technique, 67 VAND. L. REV. 1999, 2003–05 (2014) (critiquing use of
incomplete nongrantor trusts as “tax tricks” that obscure “how dying people want to leave
things behind”); Grayson M.P. McCouch, Who Killed the Rule Against Perpetuities?, 40
PEPP. L. REV. 1291, 1297–99 (2013) (describing use of long-term trusts as way of
minimizing or avoiding generation skipping transfer tax); Jeffrey Schoenblum & Neil
Schoenblum, Avoid State Income Tax with the Right Kind of Trusts, 41 EST. PLAN. 19 (2014)
(outlining multiple strategies to allow resident of states with high income tax rates to
minimize tax burden on investment assets).
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outright gifts.15 Because the beneficiaries of these trusts typically are
related to the grantor, this Article refers to these trusts as “family trusts,”
and limits its discussion to them.
Critics of family trusts bemoan the relative ease with which wealthy
taxpayers can put money in family trusts and avoid further taxation
entirely.16 Some hoped and expected that the Supreme Court would put an
end to perceived abusive income tax avoidance with a decision in North
Carolina Department of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family
Trust.17 Contrary to critics’ hopes, however, a unanimous Court ruled in
June, 2019 that a state may not tax a trust solely on the basis of a
beneficiary’s in-state residence.18 Where that beneficiary does not receive
any income from the trust, has no right to demand property from the trust,
has no right to participate in decisions about whether or when the trustee
makes distributions from the trust, and is not certain to receive property
from the trust, imposing income tax on the trust violates the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.19 Justice Alito, joined by Justice
Roberts and Justice Gorsuch, emphasized in a concurrence that “the Court
merely applies our existing precedent,” and that the Court’s failure to
consider questions absent from the Kaestner Trust case is not an invitation
to “open for reconsideration any points resolved by our prior decisions.”20
Thus it is highly unlikely that, any time in the near future, the Court will
take another case involving the income taxation of trusts.21
15

See infra Part IV.
See infra Part IV.
17
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213
(2019). Kaestner Trust is the most important decision regarding trusts and income taxation
in over sixty years. Prior to that, the most important Supreme Court case involving the
ability of a state to impose a tax on a trust was Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). In
Hanson, a Pennsylvania resident created a trust with a Delaware trustee. The trust grantor
later moved to Florida and changed the beneficiaries of the trust. One group of purported
beneficiaries residing in Florida sought to have themselves legally declared as the beneficial
owners of the trust property. The Supreme Court held that Florida lacked jurisdiction over
the Delaware trustee, a necessary party to the Florida proceeding, because the trustee was
not located in the state, conducted no administrative activity there, and no trust property was
located in Florida. Hanson, 357 U.S. at 251.
18
Kaestner Trust, 139 S. Ct. at 2224 (“The beneficiaries received no income from the
Trust, had no right to demand income from the Trust, and had no assurance that they would
eventually receive a specific share of Trust income. Given these features of the Trust, the
beneficiaries’ residence cannot, consistent with due process, serve as the sole basis for
North Carolina’s tax on trust income.”).
19
Id.
20
Id. at 2226 (Alito, J., concurring).
21
Indeed, shortly after the decision in Kaestner Trust, the Court denied certiorari in
Minn. Comm’r of Revenue v. William Fielding, a case involving a due process challenge to
Minnesota’s ability to impose income tax on a trust with assets located in that state. Minn.
Comm’r of Revenue v. William Fielding, 916 N.W. 2d 323, 323 (2018) (holding that a trust
16
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This Article brings into focus two interrelated strains of magical
thinking in the law of trusts: the one that gives rise to the existence of trusts
in the first place; and the other that anticipates that courts will play a
visible, if not active, role in minimizing the use of trusts by wealthy
individuals. Two claims follow. One is interpretative and the other is
normative (or perhaps, more accurately, strategic). This Article explains
why the Court’s decision in Kaestner Trust is correct as a matter of law and
argues that centuries of jurisprudence prevent the judicial branch from
playing a significant role in curbing the use of trusts. This argument takes
seriously concerns about wealth inequality. Dismantling the role that trusts
play in perpetuating that inequality will require nothing less than a radical
re-imagining of trust law. Shaking free of magical thinking clears the way
for meaningful trust reform.22
Part II of this Article provides a foundational, factual background
about wealth inequality in the United States, with a particular emphasis on
wealth inequality’s racial and gendered dimensions. It also provides details
about the known frequency of use and magnitude of holdings by family
trusts in this country. Part III explains the Kaestner Trust case and why the
Court’s decision is consistent with its prior due process jurisprudence.23
Part IV excavates and evaluates major themes in recent academic critiques
of family trusts, including express or implied assertions that these trusts are
mere formalities or sham vehicles subject to de facto control by the
beneficial owners.24 Part V argues that under existing law, courts are not
free to disregard trusts (other than those that are egregiously abusive) in the

could not be treated as a “resident trust” and thus was not subject to state income taxation
where most trust activity occurred outside the state but the trust did hold nonvoting stock
representing a minority interest in an S corporation doing business in Minnesota other
states), cert. denied sub nom. Bauerly v. Fielding, 139 S. Ct. 2773 (2019).
22
“Magical thinking” is a phrase from anthropology literature that describes nonrational, non-fact-based thought. See, e.g., EMILE DURKHEIM, THE ELEMENTARY FORMS OF
THE RELIGIOUS LIFE 26 (Joseph Ward Swain trans., 1969); BRONISLAW MALINOWSKI,
MAGIC, SCIENCE AND RELIGION, AND OTHER ESSAYS 67 (1948); RANDALL STYERS, MAKING
MAGIC: RELIGION, MAGIC AND SCIENCE IN THE MODERN WORLD 161–62 (2004).
Sociologists have integrated the term into their field. See, e.g., Eugene Subbotsky, Magical
Thinking—Reality or Illusion? 6 PSYCHOLOGIST 336, 338 (2004). Lawyers have not done so
to a large degree. But see, e.g., Katya Assaf, Magical Thinking in Trademark Law, 37 LAW
& SOC. INQUIRY 595, 596 (2012) (“A consistent body of research shows that in modern
Western societies magical thinking is commonplace.”); Pierre Schlag, Law as the
Continuation of God by Other Means, 85 CAL. L. REV. 427, 437 (1997) (“The key aspect of
‘magical thinking’ is the creation of metaphysical entities that make certain worldly events
come out the way one desires. To engage in magical thinking, one simply posits a thought
that will make things come out the way one desires and one then affirms that the thought is
or refers to something that is ontologically real and ontologically effective.”).
23
See infra Part III.
24
See infra Part IV.
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service of minimizing wealth inequality.25 Rather, to meaningfully reduce
wealth inequality, in the absence of major tax reform, state lawmakers
would have to impose significant limitations on trusts’ permissible
beneficiaries, duration, maximum asset values and terms. Part VI briefly
engages in a magical thinking project of its own, presenting an imagined
legal system that subjects trusts to one or more of seven invented
limitations, including radical restrictions on the identities of beneficiaries
and trustees.26 For a variety of reasons, none of these limitations should be
adopted in fact. But identifying potential problems in a fictional legal
landscape for trusts serves to elevate and focus an ongoing dialogue about
issues at the intersection of trusts and wealth inequality.27
II. WEALTH INEQUALITY IN THE UNITED STATES
A. The Size and Scope of Wealth Inequality
Generally speaking, the term “wealth,” as applied to households,
refers to the net value of all of the assets owned by the people living in that
household (typically, but not necessarily or exclusively, a group of people
related by some degree of kinship).28 Assets include stock, bonds, and
other investments; retirement savings; tangible personal property, and real
property, like the family home.29 Subtract the individual’s (or family’s)
debt obligations, and one has a reasonably accurate measure of wealth.30
25

See infra Part V.
See infra Part VI.
27
See infra Part VI.
28
See, e.g., LISA A. KEISTER, WEALTH IN AMERICA: TRENDS IN WEALTH INEQUALITY 6
(2000) (“Wealth is property; it is the value of the things people own. Wealth is measured as
net worth, defined as total assets . . . minus total liabilities . . . .”). One common-sense
definition of “wealth” is “non-financial and financial assets over which ownership rights can
be enforced and that provide economic benefits to their owners.” Aroop Chatterjee,
Measuring Wealth Inequality in South Africa: An Agenda 6 (SA-TIED Working Paper No.
52, 2019), http://sa-tied.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/pdf/SATIED_WP53_Chatterjee_M
arch_2019.pdf. “Household” is the common unit of measurement, defined as “a group of
people occupying a housing unit together,” but excluding group residences like nursing
homes or dormitories. Jonathan Eggleston & Robert Munk, Net Worth of Households, U.S.
CENSUS BUREAU 2 (Aug. 2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/public
ations/2018/demo/P70BR_155.pdf (defining “household” for purposes of reporting on
household net worth).
29
KEISTER, supra note 28 (noting that net worth is the amount by which the aggregate
value of all assets “such as stocks, bonds, checking and savings accounts, the value of the
family home, vacation homes, and other real estate” exceeds total liabilities “such as
mortgage debt, the balance on credit cards, student loans, and other car loans”).
30
Id. (defining wealth as the value of assets minus indebtedness). See also JOSEPH E.
STIGLITZ ET AL., REPORT BY THE COMMISSION ON THE MEASUREMENT OF ECONOMIC
PERFORMANCE AND SOCIAL PROGRESS 33 (2009) (suggesting that measuring material living
standards requires consideration of “the income, consumption and wealth positions of
26
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Wealth differs from income in that income refers to the inflow of money to
an individual or household, typically from employment (i.e., a salary) or in
the form of interest or dividends from investments. 31 Income is offset by
expenses for personal consumption and other maintenance.32
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, wealth in the United
States has been concentrated in the hands of the few.33 In 1913, for
example, the top 0.1% of all households held 22.5% of all national
wealth.34 By 1928, the same 0.1% owned 24.8% of all wealth.35 After a
period of decline from 1929 through 1978, wealth inequality began to
rise.36 By 2012, 0.1% of the population owned 22.0% of all wealth.37 That
gap in asset ownership between the richest segments of society and the rest
of the population represents the greatest disparity since the infamous stock
market crash that led to the Great Depression in 1929.38 In 2016, the top
0.1% held 19.0% of all wealth.39 The wealth gap continues to increase both
in the United States and world-wide.40
households or individuals”).
31
On the distinction between wealth and income, see, e.g., Palma Joy Strand,
Inheriting Inequality: Wealth, Race, and the Laws of Succession, 89 OR. L. REV. 453, 458
(2010) (“Income, generally earned by or assigned to individuals, is the inflow of resources
over a given time and is often offset to a large degree by outflows to cover expenses.
Wealth, in contrast, represents accumulated assets and often accrues to families.”).
32
Jonathan Fisher et al., Inequality and Mobility Using Income, Consumption and
Wealth for the Same Individuals, 2 WEALTH INEQUALITY: ECON. & SOC. DIMENSIONS 44, 45
(2016) (recognizing the distinctions between income, expenditures and wealth, and arguing
for measuring all three in order to gain an accurate economic picture of the individual or
household).
33
Emmanuel Saez & Gabriel Zucman, Wealth Inequality in the United States Since
1913, 131 Q. J. ECON. 519, 521 Figure I (2016) (showing top 0.1% of wealth shares for
years 1913 through 2012), http://gabriel-zucman.eu/files/SaezZucman2016QJEAppendix.pdf
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. (showing top 0.1% of households held varying percentages of aggregate wealth in
this period, e.g., 16.8% (1938), 10.3% (1948), 9.7% (1958), 10.0% (1968), and 7.1%
(1978)).
37
Id. (showing top 0.1% of households owning 22.0% of all wealth in 2012).
38
See Gabriel Zucman, Global Wealth Inequality, 11 ANN. REV. ECON. 109, 120 (2019)
(“The top 0.1% wealth share peaked at close to 25% in 1929. It then fell abruptly. . . . US
wealth concentration seems to have returned to levels last seen during the Roaring
Twenties.”). See also Andrew Keshner, America’s 1% Hasn’t Had This Much Since Just
Before the Great Depression, MARKETWATCH (Feb. 24, 2019, 2:45 PM),
https://www.marketwatch.com/story/its-been-almost-a-100-years-since-the-americas-1-hadso-much-wealth-2019-02-11 (reporting that top 10% of all U.S. households held 25% of
country’s wealth in 1929). Disparity seems to have peaked in 1910, when the top 1% of
wealth holders owned approximately 45% of all wealth in 1910. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL
IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 439 (2014) (graphically illustrating wealth inequality in the
United States 1810 to 2010).
39
Zucman, supra note 38.
40
In 2016, the top one percent held 38.6% of the country’s wealth. See, e.g., FACUNDA

CRAWFORDCRAWFORD.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2019]

MAGICAL THINKING AND TRUSTS

11/14/2019 6:37 PM

297

It is possible that the wealth gap is even larger than has been reported.
According to economist Gabriel Zucman, an estimated four percent of U.S.
financial wealth is held outside the country, in tax-haven jurisdictions with
financial secrecy laws that make it difficult to accurately account for these
assets.41 If his figure is accurate, Zucman explains, then U.S. wealth held
in non-U.S. jurisdictions causes the government to lose approximately
thirty-five billion dollars in tax revenue every year, and wealth inequality is
even more dramatic than many scholars have recognized.42
Although it is common to talk about wealth inequality by referring to
two groups—the top 0.1% and all others—the picture becomes even
bleaker when one considers the top ten percent compared with all others.43
The Congressional Budget Office has estimated that households in the top
ten percent have a seventy-five percent wealth share (and an average net
asset value of $942,000).44 Stated otherwise, the “bottom” ninety percent
of all households together own just twenty-five percent of the country’s
wealth.45 If one parses the data even more finely, the “bottom” fifty
percent holds just one percent of all wealth.46
ALVAREDO
ET
AL.,
2018
WORLD
INEQUALITY
REPORT
13
(2018),
https://wir2018.wid.world/files/download/wir2018-summary-english.pdf (illustrating in
Figure E9 the expected global increase in the share of wealth held by the top 1% of all
households).
41
GABRIEL ZUCMAN, THE HIDDEN WEALTH OF NATIONS: THE SCOURGE OF TAX HAVENS
34–43 (2015) (explaining his calculation that in 2014, $7.6 trillion in financial assets were
held in offshore tax-haven jurisdictions, many of which have strict secrecy laws).
42
Id. at 53 (estimating $190 billion in global tax revenue lost due to financial assets
held in offshore tax-haven jurisdictions, with $35 billion attributable to wealth belonging to
U.S. households).
43
See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013 5 (2016),
https://perma.cc/25EP-3AN2 (Exhibit 1: Holdings of Family Wealth, by Wealth Group;
Exhibit 2: Wealth for Families at Selected Percentiles of the Distribution); CONG. BUDGET
OFFICE, TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013 SUPPLEMENTAL DATA (2016) (Exhibit 1
showing top 10% holding 20% of all wealth in 1989 and 51% of all wealth in 2013 and
Exhibit 2 showing 90% percentile having $942,000 average wealth).
44
See TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, supra note 43 (basing calculations on
data from the Survey of Consumer Finances to show percentage of wealth owned by top
10% of all households). See also The World Top Incomes Database, PARIS SCHOOL OF
ECONOMICS, http://www.mybudget360.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/wealth-inequality
.png (last visited Oct. 9, 2019) (fixing percentage at 74%).
45
See TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, supra note 43, at 4 (Exhibit 1) (“In
2013, families in the top 10% held more than three-quarters of all family wealth, whereas in
1989, their counterparts had held two-thirds of all family wealth). According to a more
recent estimate, the top 10% of all households own 77.1% of all wealth. See Erin Duffin,
Wealth Distribution in the United States in 2016, STATISTA (Apr. 29, 2019),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/203961/wealth-distribution-for-the-us/ (“With such a
small percentage of people in the United States owning such a vast majority of the country’s
wealth, the gap between the rich and poor in America is becoming larger and larger.”).
46
TRENDS IN FAMILY WEALTH, 1989 TO 2013, supra note 43, at 4 (Exhibit 1). I use
quotation marks around “bottom” because the idea of talking about 90% or even 50% of all
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Wealth inequality has race and sex dimensions, to name just two
evaluative axes.47 The Institute for Policy Studies reports that white
households in 2016 had an average wealth of $146,984, whereas for Black
and Latinx families, those figures were $3,557 and $6,591 respectively.48
In other words, the average Black family has approximately 2.4% of the
wealth that the average white family has, and the average Latinx family has
approximately four percent of the wealth that the average white family
has.49 Households led by an Asian or Pacific Islander have a median
household net worth of $59,292 compared to $87,056 for non-Hispanic
white households.50 Using data derived from the Survey of Consumer
Finances and U.S. Census, the Pew Center arrives at similar figures
indicating the same racial disparities.51

households at the lowest rung in any hierarchy seems almost absurd.
47
See, e.g., Danaya C. Wright, Disrupting the Wealth Gap Cycles: An Empirical Study
of Testacy and Wealth, 2019 WISC. L. REV. 295, 301–03 (2019) (discussing differences
between racial and sex wealth gaps).
48
Wealth Inequality in the United States, The Racial Wealth Divide, INEQUALITY,
https://inequality.org/facts/wealth-inequality (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (comparing white,
Black and Latino household wealth in 2016, as well as white household wealth versus all
other households’ wealth in 1983). The use of the word “Latinx” in the text of this article is
an intentional choice, so as to recognize that households may be not made up solely of
males, females or people who identify as either of those genders. See, e.g., Tanisha Love
Ramirez & Zeba Blay, Why People Are Using the Term “Latinx”, HUFFINGTON POST (July
5, 2016), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/why-people-are-using-the-term-latinx_n_5775332
8e4b0cc0fa136a159 (“Latinx is the gender-neutral alternative to Latino, Latina and even
Latin@. Used by scholars, activists and an increasing number of journalists, Latinx is
quickly gaining popularity among the general public. It is part of a ‘linguistic
revolution’ that aims to move beyond gender binaries and is inclusive of the intersecting
identities of Latin American descendants.”). Such usage is not without its critics. See e.g.,
Stephen Nuño-Pérez & Gwen Aviles, Is “Latinx” Elitist? Some Push Back at the Word’s
Growing Use, NBC NEWS (Mar. 7, 2019), https://www.nbcnews.com/news/latino/latinxelitist-some-push-back-word-s-growing-use-n957036 (“But as the term gains traction, some
scholars are pointing out that there are Latinos who don’t see themselves reflected in the
word. Some see Latinx as an elitist attempt to erase a history of more traditional gender
roles, or as a distraction from other pressing issues facing Latinos in the United States.”).
49
Wealth Inequality in the United States, supra note 48 (“The median Black family,
with just over $3,500, owns just 2 percent of the wealth of the nearly $147,000 the median
White family owns. The median Latino family, with just over $6,500, owns just 4 percent
of the wealth of the median White family. Put differently, the median White family has 41
times more wealth than the median Black family and 22 times more wealth than the median
Latino family.”).
50
Alfred O. Gottshalck, Net Worth and the Assets of Households: 2002, U.S. CENSUS
BUREAU (2008), https://www2.census.gov/library/publications/2008/demo/p70-115.pdf (for
year 2002, reporting median net worth for households headed by householder by race of
$87,057 (white), $5,446 (Black), $59,292 Asian or Pacific Islander), and $7,950
(Hispanic)).
51
See Rakesh Kochhar & Richard Fry, Wealth Inequality Has Widened Along Racial,
Ethnic Lines Since End of Great Recession, PEW RES. CTR. (Dec. 12, 2014), http://www.pe
wresearch.org/fact-tank/2014/12/12/racial-wealth-gaps-great-recession/
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In the United States, women of all colors have always had less
aggregate wealth than men.52 For 2015, the median net worth of
households headed by single women was $26,580; whereas for those
headed by single men, the median was $32,300; and for those headed by
married-couple households, the median was $187,600.53 In its study of
individuals with gross assets of two million dollars or more, the Internal
Revenue Service estimates that men hold sixty percent and women hold
forty percent of the average net asset value.54 The vast majority of these
women report that their wealth comes primarily from their husbands or
other family members.55
Considering the poorest segments of the U.S. population, 13.2% of all
women seventy-five and older live in poverty, compared with 11.8% of the
total population and 11.3% of all men seventy-five and older.56
Transgender individuals of any age tend to be among the poorest
Americans, with approximately twenty-nine percent of those surveyed
[https://perma.cc/2WGL-VZJ3] (reporting that in 2013, median net worth of white
households was thirteen times greater than Black households and ten times greater than
Hispanic households). For further discussion of the racial wealth gap, see, e.g., Daria
Roithmayr, Them That Has, Gets, 27 MISS. C.L. REV. 373, 373–74 (2008); Beverly Moran
& Stephanie M. Wildman, Race and Wealth Disparity: The Role of Law and the Legal
System, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1219, 1220 (2007).
52
See Carmen Diana Deere & Cheryl R. Doss, The Gender Asset Gap: What Do We
Know and Why Does It Matter?, 12 FEMINIST ECON. 1, 2–3 (2006) (reporting that women
and children held 7.2% of national wealth in 1860; that women held 25% of probate wealth
in 1900; roughly 40% of wealth in the 1950s). The authors refer to “women” generally
without taking into account slavery and its impact on the privileged legal status white
women had compared to all others. See id.
53
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, WEALTH, ASSET OWNERSHIP, & DEBT OF HOUSEHOLDS
DETAILED TABLES 2015 Table 1 (2018), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/2015/demo/wea
lth/wealth-asset-ownership.html. See also Gwendolyn Griffith, The Evolution of Women’s
Wealth: Implications for Wealth Planners, 2014 WL 4160088 (2014) (providing similar
statistics for 2011).
54
Griffith, supra note 53, at *4–5 (evaluating distribution of net value across
individuals holding assets of $2 million or more).
55
Griffith, supra note 53, at *9. See also Wright, supra note 47, at 302–03 (“The sex
gap is also notable, although it plays out quite differently than the racial wealth gap. While
women control overall less wealth than men, of those women who do control significant
wealth, roughly three-quarters report their wealth was generated primarily from their
families or their husbands.”).
56
See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY, 2019 ANNUAL SOCIAL &
ECONOMIC SUPPLEMENT (POV-01), https://www.census.gov/data/tables/time-series/demo/in
come-poverty/cps-pov/pov-01.html#par_textimage_10 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019)
(providing data for segments of population below poverty level). See also Amber Christ &
Tracey Gronniger, Older Women & Poverty, JUST. IN AGING 3–4 (Dec. 2018),
https://www.justiceinaging.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/12/Older-Women-and-Poverty.pdf
(reporting poverty levels based on Census Bureau’s Supplemental Poverty Measure);
Juliette Cubanski et al., How Many Seniors Live in Poverty?, KAISER FAM. FOUND. 2 (Nov.
2018), files.kff.org/attachment/Issue-Brief-How-Many-Seniors-Live-in-Poverty (noting
greater poverty rates for elderly women).
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reporting that they live in poverty.57
Wealth inequality gives rise to multiple concerns. There are those
who argue that wealth inequality is, in itself, immoral.58 Others are
concerned about the consequences of wealth inequality, i.e., that it creates
undue social and political advantages for the rich.59 Frequently embedded
in that particular critique is a rhetorical nod to stereotypically “American”
ideals of egalitarianism.60 In 2013, for example, President Obama opined
that “[t]his increasing [economic] inequality is most pronounced in our
country, and it challenges the very essence of who we are as a people.”61
Similarly, former chair of the Federal Reserve Janet Yellen questioned in a
public speech whether rising income and wealth inequality is “compatible
with values rooted in our nation’s history, among them the high value
Americans have traditionally placed on equality of opportunity.”62
57

See, e.g., Jillian Edmonds, Transgender People Are Facing Incredibly High Rates of
Poverty, NAT’L WOMEN’S L. CTR. (Dec. 9, 2016), https://nwlc.org/blog/income-security-iselusive-for-many-transgender-people-according-to-u-s-transgend0er-survey (reporting that
29% of transgender individuals surveyed in 2015 reported they were living in poverty,
compared with 14% of all people in the United States). The Census Bureau reports 11.8%
of the population is living in poverty. See 2019 ANNUAL SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
SUPPLEMENT, supra note 56. Differences may be attributable to the applicable measurement
of poverty; the Supplemental Poverty Measure takes into account more than baseline food
consumption. See, e.g., Dylan Matthews, The Official Poverty Measure Is Garbage, VOX
(Sept. 12, 2017), https://www.vox.com/2015/9/16/9337041/supplemental-poverty-measure.
58
See e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 74–75 (1971). See also Xavier
Marquez, Is Income Inequality Unjust?: Perspectives from Political Philosophy, 7 POL. Q.
61 (2011); Amy J. Sepinwall, Responsibility, Repair and Redistribution in the Wake of the
Financial Crisis, 11 GEO. J. L. PUB. POL’Y 301, 313–14 (2013) (describing in general terms
the Rawlsian luck egalitarianism).
59
See, e.g., LAWRENCE LESSIG, REPUBLIC, LOST: HOW MONEY CORRUPTS CONGRESS—
AND A P LAN TO STOP IT (2011); MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE (1983); Elizabeth
Anderson, What is the Point of Equality, 109 ETHICS 287, 289 (1999).
60
Thomas Piketty locates this rhetoric in its historical context, explaining that at the
end of the nineteenth century, “in the period known as the Gilded Age, when some US
industrialists and financiers (for example John D. Rockefeller, Andrew Carnegie, and J.P.
Morgan) accumulated unprecedented wealth, many US observers were alarmed by the
thought that the country was losing its pioneering egalitarian spirit. To be sure, that spirit
was partly a myth, but it was also partly justified by comparison with the concentration of
wealth in Europe.” PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 348–49.
61
Press Release, White House, Remarks by the President on Economic Mobility (Dec.
4,
2013),
https://www.dailykos.com/stories/2013/12/04/1260116/-President-Obama-sremarks-on-economic-mobility. See also Ian Reifowitz, Obama’s Inequality Speech:
Telling the Progressive Story of American History, HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 6, 2013),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/obamas-inequality-speech_b_4394169 (quoting President
Obama’s speech and remarking that “Obama’s telling of that history always features both
progress as well as our failure to live up to the ideals of equality we lay down at the
country’s founding.”).
62
Janet Yellen, Chair, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Res. Sys., Speech at the
Conference on Economic Opportunity and Inequality, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston:
“Perspectives on Inequality and Opportunity from the Survey of Consumer Finances ”
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A third cluster of concerns about gross wealth inequality relates to
macroeconomic issues. There are commentators who believe that members
of the segment of the population with low or no savings (i.e., no wealth) do
not and cannot contribute to economic growth.63 In other words, if people
live based solely on their incomes, from paycheck to paycheck, those same
individuals by definition cannot be wealth-producers.64 They may be
consumers, but they will never create businesses that employ others.65
Finally, and perhaps most powerfully, is the idea that persistent and
significant wealth disparity undermines the stability of democratic
societies. As American entrepreneur (and self-described “plutocrat”) Nick
Hanauer has warned, “any society which allows itself to become radically
and indefensibly unequal eventually faces either an uprising or a police
state—or both.”66 Comparative law scholar Katharina Pistor makes the
same point, citing wealth disparity as a major contributing cause of the
French Revolution.67 Like Obama and Yellen, Pistor rhetorically invokes
aspirational ideals of equality, noting that wealth inequality extends well
beyond the United States, “in countries that call themselves democracies,
with their commitment to self-governance based on majoritarian, not elite,
rule. It is hard to reconcile these aspirations with levels of inequality that
smack of the Ancien Régime.”68 Although lack of records make it difficult
to measure precisely pre-Revolutionary-era French wealth inequality
levels, economist Thomas Piketty speculates that “[i]t is possible that the
top decile’s share attained or even slightly exceeded 90 percent of total
wealth on the eve of 1789 and the upper centile’s share attained or
exceeded 60 percent.”69 After the Revolution, France instituted a gift and

(October 17, 2014), https://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/yellen20141017a.htm
63
See, e.g., CHUCK COLLINS, 99 TO 1: HOW WEALTH INEQUALITY IS WRECKING THE
WORLD AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT 65–67 (2012). See also Erez Aloni, The Marital
Wealth Gap, 93 WASH. L. REV. 1, 12 (2018).
64
See COLLINS, supra note 63.
65
Id.
66
Nick Hanauer, To My Fellow Plutocrats: You Can Cure Trumpism, POLITICO (July
18, 2017), https://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2017/07/18/to-my-fellow-plutocratsyou-can-cure-trumpism-215347 (also urging employers to pay workers more, in order to
enhance individuals’ well-being and stimulate the economy). See also Nick Hanauer, The
Pitchforks Are Coming . . . For Us Plutocrats, POLITICO (July/Aug. 2014), https://www.po
litico.com/magazine/story/2014/06/the-pitchforks-are-coming-for-us-plutocrats-108014;
Nick Hanauer, Beware Fellow Plutocrats, the Pitchforks Are Coming, TED (Jul. 21, 2017),
https://www.ted.com/talks/nick_hanauer_beware_fellow_plutocrats_the_pitchforks_are_co
ming/discussion.
67
KATHARINA PISTOR, THE CODE OF CAPITAL: HOW THE LAW CREATES WEALTH AND
INEQUALITY 2 (2019).
68
Id.
69
PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 341.
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estate tax system, along with a wealth registry.70
These multiple critiques of wealth inequality correctly bring continued
attention to the wealth gap in the United States (and elsewhere). The
causes of wealth inequality are multifaceted and complex, including
systemic racism and sexism, poor quality education, overincarceration,
housing segregation, lack of financial literacy, and tax policy itself.71 A
growing group of scholars point to trusts as a symptom, or perhaps even a
cause or constitutive structure, of wealth inequality in this country.72 To
evaluate this claim, one first must understand the available data about trusts
in the United States.73
B. The Frequency and Extent of Trust Use
For many years, wealthy families have used trusts to preserve and
protect assets, and also to confer financial benefits on successive
generations.74 For example, in 1934, John D. Rockefeller, Jr., son of the
70

PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 337 (calling these taxes and the wealth registry
“astonishing innovations at the time, notable for their universal scope”).
71
See, e.g., Wright, supra note 47, at 303 (“There are countless other factors besides
estate planning that contribute to the various wealth gaps, including income inequality,
racism, housing segregation, and lack of education about how to protect and grow wealth.
Tax policy contributes to the wealth gap by privileging certain types of investments and
protecting certain kinds of gains and not others.”). See also Olatunde Johnson, Inclusion,
Exclusion, and the “New” Economic Inequality, 94 TEX. L. REV. 1647 (2016) (examining
role of geographical space in financial inequality).
72
See, e.g., Ray MADOFF, IMMORTALITY AND THE LAW: THE RISING POWER OF THE
AMERICAN DEAD 76–84 (2010) (critiquing long-term trusts); Iris Goodwin, How the Rich
Stay Rich: Using a Family Trust Company to Secure a Family Fortune, 40 SETON HALL L.
REV. 467, 468 (2010) (calling the family trust company “the masterstroke in a series of
aggressive planning techniques”); Kent D. Schenkel, Exposing the Hocus Pocus of Trusts,
45 AKRON L. REV. 63, 65–67 (2012) (critiquing, among other features of trusts, the use of
spendthrift clauses); Phyllis C. Smith, The Estate and Gift Tax Implications of Self-Settled
Domestic Asset Protection Trust: Can You Really Have Your Cake and Eat It Too?, 44 NEW
ENG. L. REV. 25 (2009) (arguing in favor of estate tax inclusion for self-settled asset
protection trusts, even when transfers to the trust are treated as completed gift for wealth
transfer tax purposes); Allison Anna Tait, The Law of High-Wealth Exceptionalism, 71 ALA.
L. REV. 4 (forthcoming 2019), http://papers.ssrn.com/ abstract_id=3406070 (“the wealth
management profession has been encouraging high-wealth families to imagine themselves
as separate, exceptional entities for several decades”); Reid Kress Weisbord, Trust Term
Extension, 67 FLA. L. REV. 73 (2015) (arguing against use of decanting power to extend
duration of trust).
73
As Zucman notes, there are undoubtedly many Americans with assets located on offshore jurisdictions. See ZUCMAN, supra notes 41–42 and accompanying text. The
discussion in this Article is limited to family trusts located in the United States.
74
See, e.g., Duke of Norfolk’s Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931 (Ch.); 3 Chan. Cas.1
(recognizing as valid a trust for barony title and associated property). This case is included
in law school casebooks to illustrate the origins of the common law rule against perpetuities
as the executory interest in the grantor’s fourth son was certain to vest, if at all, within the
lifetime of the fourth son, who was also alive at the time of the trust creation. See, e.g.,
SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 7, at 890–91 (discussing validity of executory interest in
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founder of Standard Oil, created a trust for the benefit of his six children.75
In 2002, when in his late eighties, David Rockefeller, the youngest of those
children wrote that, “[t]hese [1934] trusts, in particular, have been the
primary source of the preservation, enhancement, and transfer of the
family’s wealth from generation to generation.”76 Each of the beneficiaries
had the ability to ask a trust committee “for permission to invade our trust
for some special purpose,” and via those trusts, the children were able to
purchase Rockefeller Center from their father in 1948, at a price of $2.2
million.77 That is equal to approximately twenty-three million dollars
today.78 Forbes magazine estimates that David Rockefeller’s net worth
was approximately $3.3 billion at the time of his death.79 If that estimate is
even close to accurate, then the family trusts were very successful indeed in
preserving and enhancing family wealth.80
In the twenty-first century, wealthy business leaders like Warren
Buffett and Bill Gates have announced publicly that they will leave
minimal wealth to their heirs.81 Over 150 billionaires have signed Buffett
and Gates’ Giving Pledge, a public promise to donate the bulk of their

Duke of Norfolk’s case).
75
DAVID ROCKEFELLER, MEMOIRS 463 (2002) (describing creation of family trusts by
John D. Rockefeller, Jr. in 1934). From 1996 through 2003, I was an attorney in the Trusts
& Estates Department at Milbank LLP (then Milbank, Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP), a
firm that represented (and represents) members of the Rockefeller family. See Bridget J.
Crawford, Faculty Profile, PACE LAW SCHOOL, https://law.pace.edu/faculty/bridget-jcrawford (last visited Oct. 1, 2019), and David Rockefeller Obituary Notice by Milbank,
Tweed, Hadley & McCloy LLP, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23, 2017), https://tinyurl.com/y6j3k7x2
(“Milbank is proud to have had a close relationship with the Rockefeller family since the
early 20th century, and David Rockefeller continued this relationship . . . . Mr. Rockefeller
worked with many of our partners on numerous important transactions over the years—
among them corporate, real estate, trusts and estates, and philanthropic.”). All information
in this article about any member of the Rockefeller family comes from publicly-available
sources.
76
See ROCKEFELLER, supra note 75.
77
See ROCKEFELLER, supra note 75, at 464–69 (describing the role his brother Nelson
Rockefeller played in “persuading Father to sell us the property in 1948 for $2.2 million”).
78
See Calculate the Value of $100 in 1948, DOLLAR TIMES, https://www.dollartimes.com
/inflation/inflation.php?amount=100&year=1948 (last visited Sept. 29, 2019) (calculating
$2.2 million in 1948 as worth $23,620,197 in 2019).
79
#581 David Rockefeller, Sr., FORBES, https://www.forbes.com/profile/david-rocke
feller-sr/?list=billionaires#668ed7af6442 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019).
80
See id.
81
See, e.g., Roxanne Roberts, Why the Super-Rich Aren’t Leaving Much of Their
Fortunes to Their Kids, WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/life
style/style/why-the-very-rich-arent-giving-much-of-their-fortunes-to-their-kids/2014/08/10/
4a9551b4-1ccc-11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html (“Bill and Melinda Gates are giving a
reported $10 million for each of their three children: pocket change compared with their
$76 billion. Buffett’s three kids each have a $2 billion foundation funded by Dear Old Dad.
The rest of his money? Going to charity . . . .”).
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wealth to charity.82 In addition to having philanthropic intentions, some of
these ultra-wealthy people are concerned that successive generations not be
burdened (or boosted) by inherited wealth.83 Yet many other wealthy
Americans have taken advantage of recent changes in trust laws to create
multi-million dollar trusts that may last for an unlimited time period,
forever protecting assets from taxation and creditors.84
It is difficult, if not impossible, to accurately determine the number of
family trusts presently in operation in the United States.85 When a grantor
creates a trust, there is no filing of any certificate or document with the
state or federal government.86 The trustee of a trust may be a private
individual or a bank or a trust company.87 Private individuals acting as
trustees are not required to report their fiduciary holdings to the
government. In contrast, when a bank or trust company that is part of the
Federal Reserve System acts as trustee, that institution must make reports
each year to various federal agencies.88 The institution must disclose the
number of trust accounts under its management and the size of the trust
holdings.89 At the end of 2015, these federally regulated banks and other
institutions were the trustees of approximately 710,000 accounts (including

82
See, e.g., Peter Kotecki, The Billionaire “Giving Pledge” Signed by Bill Gates and
Elon Musk Could Soon Be Worth Up to $600 Billion, BUS. INSIDER (Jul. 18, 2018),
https://www.businessinsider.com/bill-gates-elon-musk-giving-pledge-may-reach-600billion-2018-7 (describing Gifting Pledge and naming as signatories Elon Musk and Mark
Zuckerberg, but noting that pledge does not appear to be binding).
83
See Roberts, supra note 81 (quoting recording artist Sting as saying of his estimated
$300 million net worth, “I certainly don’t want to leave them trust funds that are albatrosses
round their necks. They have to work. All my kids know that and they rarely ask me for
anything, which I really respect and appreciate.”).
84
See, e.g., McCouch, supra note 14 (describing repeal of rule against perpetuities in
multiple U.S. jurisdictions).
85
See supra notes 15–17 and accompanying text (detailing the type of trusts that are
the focus of this Article). Distinguish the gift-type trust from revocable trusts intended as
will substitutes; charitable trusts; trusts to provide asset management for disabled or
otherwise incapacitated beneficiaries; or business trusts, to give a few examples. On the
various types of trusts, see, e.g., BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES § 1 (describing general
categories of trusts).
86
Indeed, trusts for property other than real property can be created by oral declaration.
See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 20 (AM. LAW. INST. 2019) (“Validity of Oral
Inter Vivos Trusts”).
87
See, e.g., BOGERT’S TRUST AND TRUSTEES, supra note 85, § 121 (detailing multiple
factors that inform a grantor’s selection of a trustee and the range of legal persons who may
act as trustee).
88
Robert H. Sitkoff & Max M. Schanzenbach, Jurisdictional Competition for Trust
Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes, 115 YALE L.J. 356, 387–88 (2005)
(citing federal statutes that make mandatory certain filings with four different federal
agencies).
89
Id. at 388.
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charitable trusts) with an aggregate value of approximately $918 billion.90
Because reporting rules apply only to accounts for which the institution is
acting as trustee, however, these figures will necessarily represent only a
portion of the trusts in operation.
Professors Robert Sitkoff and Max Schanzenbach were among the
first to realize the importance of this publicly available federal banking
information to the study of trusts. In 2005, they reported the results of their
empirical investigation of the consequences of certain states’ repeal of the
rule against perpetuities.91 They found that between 1997 and 2003,
approximately $100 billion worth of trust assets flowed to states that had
effectively repealed the rule.92 The authors cabin their results by
explaining that it is impossible to know whether this figure represents the
creation of new trusts or the relocation of existing trusts to repeal states.93
In any event, the authors also note that studies based on the federally
available data are incomplete, because they include only trust accounts for
which a reporting institution is acting as trustee.94
To get a better understanding of the total number of trusts and the
aggregate wealth they hold, one naturally looks to publicly available tax
data. A family trust typically obtains its own taxpayer identification
number,95 but the Internal Revenue Service does not publicly disclose how
many identification numbers it issues to trusts each year. And even if the
IRS did make this information available, the fact that a trust received a
taxpayer identification number at some point does not mean that the trust is
still in existence. The trust may have terminated or otherwise expired
according to its terms. For that reason, knowing the number of taxpayer
identification numbers issued to trusts will not necessarily help determine
90

SITKOFF & DUKEMINIER, supra note 7, at 393.
Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 88, at 376.
92
Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 88, at 404 (“Within the timeframe of our
sample, 17 states abolished the RAP with a resulting average increase of $6 billion in trust
assets per state. This implies that as of 2003, roughly $100 billion in trust funds have
poured into the states that abolished the Rule ($6 billion per state * 17 states = $102 billion
in total assets).”).
93
Id. (“[W]e cannot discern the extent to which the observed increase in trust assets
reflects an inflow of newly created trusts or the poaching of already existing trusts.”).
94
Id. (“Because our sample includes only trusts administered by federally reporting
institutions, our estimates probably understate the total increase in trust assets experienced
by the abolishing states.”); Sitkoff & Schanzenbach, supra note 88, at 387–88 (citing federal
statutes that make mandatory certain filings with four different federal agencies).
95
Taxpayer Identification Numbers, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/
individuals/international-taxpayers/taxpayer-identification-numbers-tin (last visited Oct. 4,
2019) (“An Employer Identification Number (EIN) is also known as a federal tax
identification number, and is used to identify a business entity. It is also used by estates and
trusts which have income which is required to be reported on Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax
Return for Estates and Trusts.”).
91
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the actual number of existing family trusts or the extent of their holdings.
Federal fiduciary income tax returns—or the tax returns for trusts—
provide partial additional insight into the number of trusts in existence in
any particular year.96 For the tax year 2014, the Internal Revenue Service
received over 3.1 million trust income tax returns reporting approximately
$142 billion of aggregate net income.97 Approximately 637,000 trusts paid
out $5.3 million in aggregate fiduciary fees.98 This number does not give a
complete picture of all trusts in the United States, however, because many
trusts are not required to file income tax returns at all.99
State income tax data are not necessarily illuminating, either. Each
state takes a different approach to the income taxation of trusts. New York,
for example, imposes a tax on an irrevocable trust that is created under the
will of a person domiciled in the state. New York also imposes a tax on an
irrevocable trust if a trustee is domiciled in the state, the trust has source
income in the state, or the trust property is located in the state.100 Florida,
in contrast, imposes no tax at all on most trusts.101
From the patchwork of available information about federal reporting
institutions’ holdings and trusts’ federal tax returns, one cannot accurately
estimate the number of all family trusts or their holdings. There likely are
hundreds of millions of private express trusts presently in existence. 102
These trusts likely hold assets worth trillions of dollars.103 But a complete
96
See Form 1041, U.S. Income Tax Return for Estates and Trusts 2018, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f1041.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2019)
(income tax return to be filed by a decedent’s estate or any one of several types of trusts).
97
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, STATISTICS OF INCOME BUREAU, FIDUCIARY RETURNS –
SOURCES OF INCOME, DEDUCTIONS, AND TAX LIABILITY – TAX STATUS AND SIZE OF GROSS
INCOME
2014,
https://www.irs.gov/statistics/soi-tax-stats-fiduciary-returns-sources-ofincome-deductions-and-tax-liability-tax-status-and-size-of-gross-income (last visited Oct.
15, 2019).
98
Id. at
99
See 26 U.S.C §§ 671–79 (2018) (providing rules relevant for determining multiple
circumstances in which trust income or other tax items are attributable to the grantor or
someone other than the trust). See also Instructions for Form 1041, INTERNAL REVENUE
SERVICE, https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/i1041.pdf (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (listing
“Who Must File”).
100
See N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(C) (McKinney 2014) (defining “resident trust”
subject to taxation in the state); N.Y. TAX LAW § 605(b)(3)(D) (McKinney 2014)
(describing those resident trusts not subject to state income taxation).
101
See generally RICHARD W. NENNO, BASES OF STATE INCOME TAXATION OF
NONGRANTOR TRUSTS FOR 2018 (2019), https://www.actec.org/assets/1/6/Nenno_state_non
grantor_tax_survey.pdf. Other states that do not impose income tax on trusts include
Alaska, Nevada, South Dakota, Texas and Wyoming. See id.
102
See supra note 97 and accompanying text.
103
If reporting institutions held $918 billion in assets at the end of 2015, supra note 88
and accompanying text, it is likely that the total of all assets held in all trusts reaches the
trillions, once one includes trusts with private trustees and any trust assets such as real
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picture remains to be drawn. The lack of clarity about how many trusts
there are and how much wealth these trusts hold, combined with the stark
facts of wealth inequality,104 mean that trusts are an easy target for critics.
When, during the 2018-2019 term, the Supreme Court took up its first case
in over sixty years concerning the state income taxation of trusts, one
particular trust for a North Carolina woman named Kimberley Rice
Kaestner brought a spotlight to family trusts.105
III. KAESTNER TRUST AND DUE PROCESS
A. Background
The story of how Kimberley Rice Kaestner came to be the beneficiary
of a family trust begins in 1992. After a brief stint practicing law with an
elite New York Law firm, Joseph Lee Rice had a long and successful
career in private equity.106 In 1992, when he was sixty years old, Rice
transferred $100,000 to an irrevocable trust for the benefit of his
descendants.107 At that time, the beneficiaries were Rice’s daughter
Kimberley, age twenty-three, and his two other children, Daniel and Lee.108
Rice was a New York resident and domiciliary; so was the initial trustee,
William Matteson.109 The trust was subject to taxation by the State of New
York. In 1995, Matteson, the initial trustee, moved to Florida.110
Subsequently, Kimberley Rice Kaestner moved to North Carolina, where

property and closely-held business interests that cannot be maintained in a bank or trust
company. This is, however, speculation only.
104
See supra Part II.A.
105
See N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct.
2213, 2218 (2019); supra note 17 and accompanying text.
106
See Founder, Joseph L. Rice, III, CDR-INC.COM, https://www.cdrinc.com/professionals/joseph-l.-rice-iii (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (providing biographical
information for Joseph Lee Rice III); Joseph L. Rice III, REVOLVY.COM,
https://www.revolvy.com/page/Joseph-L.-Rice-III (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (providing
biographical information for Joseph Lee Rice III).
107
Complaint at ¶ 11, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of
Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2012 WL
12282023 [hereinafter Complaint], aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814
S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019). See also Joint Appendix, Kimberley
Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL
1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2018 WL 7469782, aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019); Affidavit of
David H. Bernstein, Appendix to Exhibit A, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v.
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12 CVS 8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23,
2015), 2012 WL 12282023 [hereinafter Bernstein Affidavit], aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct.
App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
108
Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶ 17.
109
Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶ 13.
110
Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶ 16.
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she established both her residence and domicile.111
The trust created by Rice provided that on the tenth anniversary of the
trust’s creation, i.e., on December 30, 2002, the trust divided into separate
shares, with one share held in further trust for each of Rice’s children and
their respective descendants as “Beneficiaries” of that separate share
trust.112 During both the initial ten-year term of the trust and the continued
administration of the separate share trusts, the trust instrument directed the
trustee to consider the trust funds a “family asset” and “to be liberal in the
exercise of discretion . . . to meet the needs of the Beneficiaries, including,
without limitation, to provide for their health, education and welfare, to
purchase or provide a home for them, and to aid them at the time of
marriage or in setting up a business, rather than to preserve such
principal.”113 On the adult child’s fortieth birthday, the trust would
terminate automatically, and the adult child would receive all of the trust
assets.114
After Matteson resigned as initial trustee in 2005, David H. Bernstein,
a resident and domiciliary of Connecticut, became the successor trustee.
Shortly thereafter, Bernstein split the separate share trusts for investment
purposes. (Previously it seems that they were split only for administrative
purposes.)115
When Kimberley Rice Kaestner found out about the trust for her
benefit in 2006, she was approximately 37 years old.116 At that time, her
111

See Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶ 17 (stating that Kaestner moved to North
Carolina in 1997); Bernstein Affidavit at ¶ 8 (stating that Kaestner “moved to North
Carolina in 1997).
112
Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶ 17.
113
Copy of Trust Agreement at ¶ 1.4(c), Appendix A to Affidavit of David H.
Bernstein, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12CVS-8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2012 WL 12282023
[hereinafter Trust Agreement] (stating that Kaestner “moved to North Carolina in 1997,
almost five years after the Family Trust’s creation”), aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. App.
2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
114
Trust Agreement, supra note 113, at ¶ 1.2(c).
115
Bernstein Deposition at 91–93, Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C.
Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS-8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015),
2012 WL 12282023 [hereinafter Bernstein Deposition] (stating that Kaestner “moved to
North Carolina in 1997, almost five years after the Family Trust’s creation”), aff’d, 789 S.E.
645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
Bernstein did so because one of Rice’s three children was substantially younger than the
others, and Bernstein believed that the younger child’s trust should be invested differently.
Id. (“I didn’t believe that the investment philosophy for all three trusts needed to be the
same. One of Mr. Rice’s children, for example, is much younger, and so has a very
different investment time frame.”).
116
Kimberley Rice Kaestner did not find out about the trust for benefit until 2006, when
she was approximately 37 years old. Kaestner Deposition at 84, Kimberley Rice Kaestner
1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS-8740, 2015 WL 1880607 (N.C.
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trust had approximately $13 million in assets.117 Kaestner expressed
trepidation about managing that amount of money when she turned forty.118
Undoubtedly informed by this view, Bernstein exercised the authority
granted to him as trustee under New York law to “decant” the trust assets
into a further trust that did not terminate at Kaestner’s fortieth birthday.119
During the years 2005 through 2008 inclusive, Bernstein, as trustee of
Kaestner’s separate share trust—The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992
Family Trust—paid more than $1.3 million in income tax to the State of
North Carolina.120 Bernstein filed for a refund on two grounds. He
asserted first that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
prevented North Carolina from imposing tax on the trust’s income, given
that the trust’s only connection with the forum state was Kaestner’s
residence and that she received no distributions of income from the trust
during those years.121 The trustee next argued that the Commerce Clause of
Article I of the U.S. Constitution prohibited North Carolina from taxing the
trust, because there was no substantial nexus between the forum
jurisdiction and the taxed entity (i.e., the trust).122
The Superior Court of North Carolina, Wake County, granted the
trustee’s motion for summary judgment.123 The Superior Court reasoned
that the North Carolina taxing statute violated both the Due Process Clause,
because the trustee lacked the necessary minimum contacts in the state,124
Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), 2012 WL 12282023 [hereinafter Kaestner Deposition], aff’d, 789
S.E. 645 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213
(2019).
117
Id.
118
Id. (“[My father and I] had several discussions, and I felt nervous about being given
that sum of money and unsure as to whether I would do a good job with that money.”).
119
See Bernstein Deposition, supra note 115, at 96. The basic theory behind decanting
is that if a trustee had sole and absolute discretion to pay all of the trust assets to a trust
beneficiary, transferring them to a trust for the same beneficiary is an exercise of a lesser
included power. For a general introduction to the topic of decanting, the details of which
are beyond the scope of this article, see, e.g., William R. Culp & Briani Bennett Mellen,
Trust Decanting: An Overview and Introduction to Creative Planning Opportunities, 45
REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 1 (2010); Ronald R. Volkmer, Common Law Trust Decanting,
41 EST. PLAN. 43 (2014). For a comprehensive overview of the tax consequences of
decanting, including potential gift and estate tax consequences to a beneficiary, see Diana
S.C. Zeydel & Jonathan G. Blattmachr, Tax Effects of Decanting—Obtaining and
Preserving the Benefits, 111 J. TAX’N 288 (2009).
120
See, e.g., Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 24–25.
121
See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law”). Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 5–6.
122
Complaint, supra note 107, at ¶¶ 37–38. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (reserving
to Congress the sole power to regulate commerce among the states).
123
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS8740, 2015 WL 1880607, at *1–2 (N.C. Super. Ct. Apr. 23, 2015), aff’d, 789 S.E. 645 (N.C.
Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
124
Id. at *17–21.
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and the Commerce Clause, because the state did not have a “substantial
nexus” with the trust that was “fairly related” to any services the state
provided.125
On appeal, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina affirmed the trial
court’s grant of the trustee’s motion for summary judgment, on the grounds
that the trust did not have minimum contacts with the state, given that no
trust administration took place in the state, no trust property was located in
the state, the trustee was not a domiciliary or resident of the state, and the
beneficiary received no distributions of income while in the state.126
Having decided the case on due process grounds, the Court of Appeals did
not reach the Commerce Clause issue.127
Although the State of North Carolina lost its case at both the trial
court and appellate levels, it appealed to the North Carolina Supreme
Court. The state Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the lower courts,
again citing the lack of minimum contacts between the state and the trust.128
The North Carolina Department of Revenue then appealed to the Supreme
Court of the United States.129
B. The Supreme Court’s Due Process Jurisprudence
The issue in Kaestner Trust as framed by the Supreme Court was
whether North Carolina’s imposition of tax on trust income that is for the
“benefit of” a North Carolina resident violates the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment.130 The Court held that the North Carolina
statute did violate the Due Process Clause in this case, on the grounds that
Kaestner did not have “some degree of possession, control, or enjoyment of
the trust property or a right to receive that property.”131 The Court also
125

Id. at *26–32.
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 789 S.E. 645,
648-51 (N.C. Ct. App. 2016), aff’d 814 S.E.2d 43 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
127
Id. at 651.
128
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, 814 S.E.2d 43,
51 (N.C. 2018), aff’d 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (“For taxation of a foreign trust to satisfy the
due process guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment and the similar pledge in Article I,
Section 19 of our state constitution, the trust must have some minimum contacts with the
State of North Carolina such that the trust enjoys the benefits and protections of the State.
When, as here, the income of a foreign trust is subject to taxation solely based on its
beneficiaries’ availing themselves of the benefits of our economy and the protections
afforded by our laws, those guarantees are violated.”).
129
Various amici had filed briefs in favor of Petitioner, the North Carolina Department
of Revenue. The docket shows a total of fourteen amicus briefs filed: three in support of the
Petitioner, the North Carolina Department of Revenue; nine in support of Respondent, the
Trustee of The Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust; and two neutral briefs. N.C.
Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019).
130
Id. at 2217 (quoting N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 105–160.2 (2017)).
131
Id. at 2222.
126
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rejected the argument advanced by North Carolina that if the state could
not tax trusts based solely on the beneficiary’s residence there, all state tax
systems would be undermined, pointing out that “North Carolina is one of a
small handful of States that rely on beneficiary residence as a sole basis for
trust taxation, and one of an even smaller number that will rely on the
residence of beneficiaries regardless of whether the beneficiary is certain to
receive trust assets.”132
Shortly after the North Carolina Supreme Court issued its opinion in
Kaestner Trust, but before the U.S. Supreme Court heard oral arguments in
the case, the Court had issued a landmark ruling in South Dakota v.
Wayfair, which upheld a state income tax imposed on certain out of state
retailers that lacked a physical presence in the state.133 In doing so, the
Court partially overruled its prior decision in Quill Corp. v. North
Dakota.134 For that reason, some commentators speculated that the Court
might be inclined to apply a “no trust presence required” analysis in
Kaestner Trust.135 But Wayfair was decided under the Commerce Clause,
not the Due Process Clause (the basis for the Kaestner Trust challenge to
the North Carolina tax), so the Wayfair analysis did not apply to Kaestner
Trust.136
In deciding in favor of the trustee in Kaestner Trust, the Court instead
relied on its earlier due process analysis in Quill, which was not overruled
by Wayfair, to require a two-step test. First, there must be “some definite
link, some minimum connection, between a state and the person, property
or transaction it seeks to tax.”137 Second, the income taxable to the state
must be “rationally related to the ‘value connected with the taxing
State.’”138 In evaluating the first part of the test—the minimum
connection—Justice Sotomayor, writing for a unanimous Court, applied the
“minimum contacts” test of International Shoe.139 The Court reasoned that
132
Id. at 2225 (“[T]he State argues that ruling in favor of the Trust will undermine
numerous state taxation regimes. Today’s ruling will have no such sweeping effect. North
Carolina is one of a small handful of states that rely on the residency of beneficiaries
regardless of whether the beneficiary is certain to receive trust assets.”) (citation omitted).
133
South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018).
134
Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992) (finding under Commerce Clause
that a state must have a “substantial nexus” in order to impose sales and use tax on out of
retailer, and that nexus not satisfied where the company had no sales representatives or
stores in the jurisdiction), overruled in part by Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2080.
135
See, e.g., Daniel Mudd, I’ve Got Trust Issues—Are Nonresident Trusts the New
Nexus Fight, 28 J. MULTISTATE TAX’N 35, 37 (2018).
136
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2091.
137
Id. at 2220 (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 308) (internal quotations omitted).
138
Id. (citing Quill, 504 U.S. at 308).
139
Id. at 2220. See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (finding
that defendant must have “certain minimum contacts” with the State so that subjecting the
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the test was not satisfied in this case for multiple reasons. Justice
Sotomayor cited the facts that the trustee resided out of state, the trust
records and assets were maintained out of state, no trust property was held
in the state, the trust grantor never resided in North Carolina, trust income
was not distributed to any beneficiary in North Carolina, and the
beneficiaries had “no right to demand income and are uncertain to ever
receive it.”140 The beneficiaries simply lived in North Carolina, and
residency alone does not constitute “minimum contacts,” Justice
Sotomayor reasoned.141
In its opinion, the Court distinguished this case from those involving
trusts that make income distributions to beneficiaries located in the state,
have a resident trustee, hold assets in the state, or conduct trust
administration in the state.142 The concurring opinion written by Justice
Alito, and joined by Justice Roberts and Justice Gorsuch, discussed two
cases (also cited in the unanimous opinion) that rejected as unconstitutional
attempts by the Commonwealth of Virginia to impose a tax on
undistributed trust assets to which the beneficiaries were not entitled, and
where the trust otherwise had no connection to Virginia.143 For Justice
Alito, these cases were outcome-determinative, and the Court’s failure to
consider other factual scenarios was not an invitation to “open for
reconsideration any points resolved by our prior decisions.”144 To the
casual reader, it would appear that the Court considered this to be a
relatively easy case, and that the Court believes that it has provided
adequate guidance on most questions involving the state income taxation of
trusts.
Before the oral argument in Kaestner Trust, in an essay published in
the UCLA Law Review Discourse, Professor Michelle Simon and I
accurately predicted how the Court would rule, and that the Court would
base its decision on the determination that an in-state beneficiary’s
residence, without other connections between the trust and the taxing
jurisdiction, does not satisfy the “minimum contacts” test of International
Shoe.145 What we did not predict was the strong reaction from academics
defendant to jurisdiction in the state “does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.’”).
140
Wayfair, 138 S. Ct. at 2221.
141
Id. at 2220–21.
142
Id. at 2220 (citing Hanson v. Denkla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); Greenough v. Tax
Assessors of Newport, 331 U.S. 486 (1947); Curry v. McCanless, 307 U.S. 357 (1939);
Maguire v. Trefry, 253 U.S. 12 (1920)).
143
Id. at 2227–28 (Alito, J., concurring) (citing Safe Deposit & Trust Co. of Baltimore
v. Virginia, 280 U.S. 83 (1929) and Brooke v. Norfolk, 277 U.S. 27 (1928)).
144
See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
145
Bridget J. Crawford & Michelle S. Simon, The Supreme Court, Due Process and
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who felt that the Court had either missed an opportunity to minimize
strategic tax planning by wealthy individuals or that the Court
fundamentally misunderstands how family trusts operate. The next Part
engages with those reactions and suggests that they are grounded more
squarely in notions of fair play—and an intellectual tradition critical of
wealth inequality146—than legal rules of civil procedure or substantive
doctrine governing trusts or taxation.
IV. TRUST CRITIQUES
Undoubtedly, there will be much written in the coming months and
years about the Court’s decision in Kaestner Trust.147 Two national
colleagues, Professor Carla Spivack and Professor Daniel Hemel, were
among the first to publish essays after the Court issued its opinion on June
21, 2019. Spivack and Hemel already were familiar with the case; they
were among several law professors who signed (or had a role in drafting
and signed) one of the fourteen amici briefs submitted to the Court in
Kaestner Trust.148 Spivack joined one brief in favor of the Petitioner, the
North Carolina Department of Revenue.149 Hemel co-wrote and signed a

State Income Taxation of Trusts, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 2, 12–17 (2019) (accurately
predicting, prior to the date that the Court heard oral arguments in Kaestner Trust, that the
Court would rule in favor of the trustee and explaining the reasons the Court would do so).
We acknowledge in our essay that the lack of uniformity in state income tax laws makes it
possible, even in states that impose income tax on trusts, for some trusts to avoid income
taxation altogether, and so those states might want to adopt so-called “throw-back” tax rules
to recapture income attributable to the time period that a beneficiary lived in the jurisdiction,
but did not receive until after moving out of the state. Id. at 17.
146
See generally PIKETTY, supra note 38. I use the term “critical” here in the dictionary
sense of tending to criticize, as opposed to referring to an intellectual tradition of trust
scholarship in the tradition of Critical Legal Studies, Feminist Legal Theory, Critical Race
Theory, or Critical Tax Theory, for example. See Critical, MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY
(2019). See also Bridget J. Crawford & Anthony C. Infanti, A Critical Research Agenda for
Wills, Trusts, and Estates, 49 REAL PROP. TR. & EST. L.J. 317, 318 (2014) (defining critical
trusts and estates scholarship as concerned with “examining why the law has developed in
the way it has and considering what impact the law has on historically disempowered groups
such as people of color; women of all colors; lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender
individuals; low-income and poor individuals; the disabled; and nontraditional families”).
147
The Supreme Court does not take many estate and gift tax cases, so lawyers and
professors who specialize in this area are usually enthusiastic about writing about them
when opportunities arise. See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Foreword – The Supreme Court’s
Estate Planning Jurisprudence, 42 ACTEC L.J. 1, 1 (2016) (describing “overwhelmingly
positive” and “rapid” response to a call for contributions to an issue of the American
College of Trust and Estate Counsel Law Journal devoted to the role of the Supreme Court
in the “development of contemporary estate planning practice”).
148
See supra note 129.
149
Brief for Law Professors John V. Orth et al. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner,
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019)
(listing as additional amici Kent D. Schenkel, Carla Spivack and Danaya C. Wright).
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separate brief, also in support of the Petitioner.150
In highlighting the commentaries of Spivack and Hemel, the aim in
this Part is not to undertake a point-by-point analysis of perceived
substantive errors or misperceptions in their particular analyses; reasonable
minds disagree about multiple issues in the case.151 Rather, the essays of
Spivack and Hemel are significant because they raise larger concerns that
help frame new discussions of wealth inequality. This Part locates the
authors’ specific discussions of the Kaestner Trust case in the growing
body of critical academic analysis of family trusts generally. Taken in
aggregate, the critiques can serve as a springboard for imagining a
dramatically different legal approach to trusts, and one that could reduce
the wealth gap.
A. The Liberal Property Approach
Consider first Professor Spivack’s essay “Due Process, State Taxation
of Trusts and the Myth of the Powerless Beneficiary: A Response to
Bridget Crawford and Michelle Simon.”152 Spivack writes that Kaestner
Trust is “a rare opportunity for the Court to address the tax inequity that
allows the wealthy to accumulate assets tax free and in so doing, force
those with less to make up the difference and deplete the public fisc. It
offers a rare opportunity for the Court to see through the trust’s sleight of
hand.”153 Spivack’s essay responds to the arguments in favor of the trustee,
not the Court’s actual decision. (Spivack wrote her essay before—but the
journal published it after—the Court issued its ruling).154 In her focus on
the details of the Kaestner Trust case, Spivack makes three larger
contributions to the conceptual conversation about trusts.
150
Brief for Tax Law Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, N.C. Dep’t of
Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213 (2019) (listing as
amici Daniel Hemel, Brian Galle, David Gamage, Michael Knoll, Ruth Mason, and Adam
Thimmesch).
151
As evidence that thoughtful lawyers disagree about many issues in the Kaestner
Trust case, consider the multiple amici briefs submitted in the case. See supra notes 148–
150 and accompanying text. In my view, the analyses in the briefs submitted on behalf of
the Petitioner, the North Carolina Department of Revenue, as well as subsequent analyses
by Spivack and Hemel, are substantively flawed on many levels. What I see as errors and
misapplication of the law (but Spivack and Hemel do not) can be addressed in future
dialogue, if we choose. The aim here, however, is to engage with the themes in these
critiques and to explore how they can contribute to a more focused discussion about the
relationship of trusts and wealth inequality. See infra Part IV.A.
152
Carla Spivack, Due Process, State Taxation of Trusts and the Myth of the Powerless
Beneficiary: A Response to Bridget Crawford and Michelle Simon, 67 UCLA L. REV. DISC.
46 (2019).
153
Id. at 68–69.
154
Email from Carla Spivack to Bridget Crawford (July 24, 2019 16:53 EDT) (on file
with author).
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First, Spivack’s analysis proceeds from a liberal private property
perspective, and that leads her to particular results in the trust context. In
the words of U.K. scholar Johanna Jacques, the liberal private property
view treats property as “primarily about persons and their interests, things
playing merely a secondary role.”155 That is, property exists only in
relationship to a person who has or seeks ownership and the “wedge” that
the trust places between a trust’s beneficiaries and the trust property has
little or no independent significance.156
In Spivack’s liberal approach to private property, there is little (if any)
room for trusts. She decries the focus on the state’s jurisdiction over the
trust as a “red herring,” because the trust, in her view, is not subject to
taxation: “what is being taxed is the beneficiary’s share of trust income—
thus, the beneficiary.”157 Spivack assumes that the beneficiary must (and
should) be treated as the owner of the trust property for income tax
purposes, even if no income is distributed out to her. The trust property
cannot belong to the trustee, because the trustee “by definition is barred
from enjoying any beneficial interest in the trust property—the only person
who may receive beneficial interest is the beneficiary.”158 In Spivack’s
world, if the trust property does not belong legally to the grantor, and
cannot belong beneficially to the trustee, then it must belong for income tax
purposes to the beneficiary.159 This is not, however, the way that any of the
155

Jacques, supra note 8, at 202 (emphasis in the original).
Jacques, supra note 8, at 202, 204 (describing the underlying premise of the liberal
view of property as “the whole purpose of property is to provide and justify control by
persons over things”).
157
Spivack, supra note 152, at 50.
158
Id. (“Taxing the beneficiary in this case is entirely consistent with the basic principle
of tax law that a person who controls and receives benefit from income should pay taxes on
it.”).
159
Spivack cites tax law in support of this either/or proposition. Spivack, supra note
152, at 61 (“Tax law also supports the conclusion that the beneficiary here had sufficient
power over her share of trust income to be considered in control of it for tax
purposes. . . . [I]f the trust instructs the trust to distribute funds to a beneficiary for her
‘health education and welfare,’ the gift is considered complete because the beneficiary can
successfully force a distribution that falls within that standard.”). It is axiomatic, however,
that different rules apply for income, estate and gift tax purposes. The existence of an
ascertainable standard in a trust causes a transfer to a trust to be treated as complete for gift
tax purposes in those cases where the grantor is also the trustee. See 26 U.S.C. § 2511
(2018), Treas. Reg. § 25.2511-1(g)(2), § 25.2511-2(e) (2018) (emphasis added). The
ascertainable standard also will cause the gift to be treated as complete for income tax
purposes, where the grantor is acting as trustee, causing beneficiary to be taxed on the trust
income. 26 U.S.C. § 674(b)(5)(A). In Kaestner Trust, the grantor was not acting as trustee,
however. The gift was complete for estate tax purposes because the trust was irrevocable
and the grantor retained no “strings” over the trust property. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 2036–2038.
Generally speaking, the trust pays tax on accumulated trust income; the beneficiaries pay tax
on distributed and distributable trust income. 26 U.S.C. §§ 641(b) (taxable income of trust
shall be paid by fiduciary unless otherwise provided); 652 (inclusion of amounts in gross
156
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fifty states actually tax trust income.160
Flowing from Spivack’s liberal conception of property rights, her
second important contribution to the discussion of trusts is her treatment of
the split of legal and equitable title in family trusts as a mere formality,
because “the reality in most family trusts like the one here is the sole
purpose is to benefit the beneficiary, who is usually a child or grandchild of
the grantor.”161 It is not obvious, however, why having a family member as
a trust beneficiary nullifies any legal ownership or duties of the trustee.
The beneficiaries’ rights that Spivack references (the right to be considered
for an exercise of discretion, the right to demand an accounting, and the
right to bring legal claims against the trustee) do not depend on or arise
from the beneficiaries’ being strangers to the grantor. The rights exist
because of the title split, the legal relationship between the trustee and the
beneficiaries. It seems circular to cite the beneficiary’s informal exercise
of one of her rights (Kaestner’s “complaining about the trust’s large legal
expenses”) as evidence that the beneficiary was so deeply enmeshed in
trust management that she should be treated as the owner of the property
for tax purposes.162 True, Kaestner could (and did) borrow against trust
property.163 But loans are not income for tax purposes because they are
offset by corresponding obligations to repay.164 Only if one believes that
the split between legal and equitable title is a mere formality, a sham, does
one conclude that Kaestner would receive any property she requested from
the trust and should be treated as its present owner for income tax
purposes.165
Spivack’s third major contribution to the discussion of trusts is her
construction of existing state tax laws as having present authority to impose
a tax on undistributed trust income, solely on the basis of a beneficiary’s
residence in a jurisdiction.166 This view is a sort of variation on general
income of beneficiaries of trusts distributing current income); 662 (inclusion of amounts in
gross income of beneficiaries of trusts with distributable income). But the grantor may
specifically design the trust instrument to cause the trust income to be taxable to the grantor.
26 U.S.C. §§ 671–684 (situations in which grantor or others will be treated as owner of trust
income for income tax purposes).
160
See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 101.
161
Spivack, supra note 152, at 49 (referring to the “myth of the powerless beneficiary”).
162
Spivack, supra note 152, at 69.
163
Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr. v. N.C. Dep’t of Revenue, No. 12-CVS8740, 2015 WL 1880607, at *2 (N.C. Super. Ct. 2015).
164
See, e.g., Cmm’r of Internal Revenue v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S.
203, 207–08 (1990) (citing basic principle of taxation that the “receipt of a loan is not
income”).
165
Spivack, supra note 152, at 69 (“the record makes clear that Kimberley Kaestner
understood she had access to the assets in the trust if she wanted them, for charitable or
other purposes”).
166
Spivack, supra note 152, at 49 (urging the Supreme Court to “respect state taxing
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jurisdiction jurisprudence: the determination that a person is domiciled in a
state will mean that she and any property held in a family trust for her
benefit will be subject to all of the state’s laws (including its tax laws).167
Spivack’s construction of the tax law—although magical thinking, insofar
as it is inconsistent with any actual state law168—flows directly from her
broad concept of what it means to “benefit” from a trust. She focuses on a
beneficiary’s “property power,” defined as the beneficiary’s “chance to
make choices and take opportunities that are unavailable to other
people.”169 She goes on to say that Kaestner’s property power allowed her
“to make different life choices,” such as not saving for “retirement, college
tuition, illness, or job loss.”170
And, in the event that property power is not a convincing enough
basis for the imposition of tax on a beneficiary with undistributed trust
income, Spivack also cites as evidence that Kaestner should be subject to
income tax Kaestner’s alleged “power to decline distributions,”171 the fact
that “[she] lived off the trust assets indirectly” while in North Carolina, 172
that she paid in-state tuition at a state university, and that she benefited
from the state’s roads, police, and emergency response systems.173 If these
authority”).
167
For a discussion of the difference between general jurisdiction and specific
jurisdiction, see Crawford & Simon, supra note 145, at 14. See also Philip S. Goldberg et
al., The U.S. Supreme Court’s Personal Jurisdiction Paradigm Shift to End Litigation
Tourism, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 51 (2019); Todd David Peterson, Categorical
Confusion in Personal Jurisdiction Law, 76 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 655 (2019).
168
See, e.g., NENNO, supra note 101.
169
Spivack, supra note 152, at 49.
170
Spivack, supra note 152, at 62 (drawing on Justice Kagan’s line of questioning at
oral argument).
171
Spivack, supra note 152, at 51. Spivack does not cite to a particular source for this
claim, but it may be that she is referring to Kaestner’s desire that the trust not terminate on
her fortieth birthday. See supra notes 118–119 and accompanying text. The New York
decanting statute specifically grants to the invaded trust’s beneficiaries the right to receive
notice of the trustee’s exercising of a decanting power and standing to object to the
decanting. N.Y. EST. POWERS & TR. LAW § 10-6.6 (McKinney 2017). Therefore, in most
cases involving a competent beneficiary, it does not seem unreasonable for a trustee to
discuss any decanting plans with the beneficiary and to consider any views expressed by the
beneficiary, if for no reason other than to prepare for any possible objections. See generally
Mark S. Poker & Amy S. Kiiskila, Prevention and Resolution of Trust and Estate
Controversies, 33 ACTEC J. 262 (2008) (describing strategies for fiduciary administration
of trust and estates in a way that will minimize controversies with beneficiaries).
172
Spivack, supra note 152, at 57. Spivack seems to support this claim of indirect profit
from the trust assets because “the record contains no evidence” that Kaestner “worked at
all.” Id. Even if Kaestner was not formally employed, her household may have had other
income (i.e., her husband’s wealth or salary). Furthermore, Kaestner did invest in some sort
of commercial venture involving vanilla. Bernstein Deposition, supra note 115, at *100.
Whether it is fair to say that Kaestner herself, or the Kaestner household, did not contribute
to the North Carolina economy, then, is unclear. See id.
173
Spivack, supra note 152, at 62–63.
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facts, taken together, were enough to cause Kaestner to be deemed a
recipient of income from her trust, as Spivack believes they do, then North
Carolina’s would be able to tax the value of those “distributions.”174
There are multiple doctrinal obstacles to using either “property
power” or the other referenced benefits as grounds for taxing a beneficiary
like Kaestner, however. First, the actual state law definition of trust
income is narrow.175 “Income” for purposes of North Carolina trust law is
“money or property” received by a fiduciary as “current return from a
principal asset.”176 Property power—defined as the “chance to make
choices”—and the ability to use roads or receive in-state tuition are not
susceptible to entrustment and thus could not give rise to trust income.177
Second, generally speaking the law does not tax a financially
privileged person’s “ability to make choices” just because she has them and
a less privileged person does not. This makes common sense. It is not
obvious that Kaestner’s learning, at age thirty-seven, that she was the
discretionary beneficiary of a thirteen million dollar trust caused her to
make qualitatively different life choices (and there is no evidence to
support such an assertion in this case).178 Even assuming that Kaestner had
made certain financially-informed “life choices,” how might one begin to
parse which of these were attributable to her specific knowledge that she
was the discretionary beneficiary of this particular trust (and thus she
should be taxed on its undistributed trust income)? Kaestner’s decisions
might have been motivated instead by general hopes and beliefs (if she had
them) that she could rely on her father for lifetime gifts to meet her needs
for tuition and illness-related expenses.179 Existing law does not tax the
adult (or minor) children of wealthy individuals simply because they have
more life choices than others do. This is akin to the law’s egalitarian
income treatment of taxpayers without regard to their educational
backgrounds. That is, the law does not impose an income tax on someone
who receives her degree at an elite institution as opposed to a community
174

See generally Maguire, supra note 142, at 16–17 (state taxation of actual distribution
of trust income is valid as a matter of due process).
175
See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 37A-1-102(4) (West 2018) (adopting Uniform Principal
and Income Act, including definition of trust income as “money or property that a fiduciary
receives as current return from a principal asset”).
176
Id.
177
See supra notes 169–170 and accompanying text (defining “property power”).
178
See supra note 116 and accompanying text.
179
Such direct payments of tuition or medical expenses would, in fact, be consistent
with sound estate planning, insofar as the transfers are not subject to the gift tax under 26
U.S.C. § 2503(e) (excluding from definition of taxable gifts transfer that otherwise meet the
requirements of a “qualified transfer” to certain educational institutions or as payment for
medical care). See also Treas. Reg. § 25.2503-6 (2018) (further defining “qualified
transfer” for purposes of IRC § 2503).
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college, for example, even though the former likely will have more (or
more lucrative) employment choices than will the latter.180 Freedom and
choice—a kind of subjective mental state combined with actual or
perceived personal well-being or comfort—are not generally subject to
income taxation.181
A third challenge to Spivack’s expansive approach to taxation is the
“minimum contacts” standard of International Shoe, which suggests that
“traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice” would not be met
by a beneficiary’s use of roads and the potential availability to her of public
safety and health services.182 Otherwise, even the casual out-of-state
traveler driving on North Carolina roads could expect to owe income tax on
the fraction of her salary from employment, say, that accrues while the
traveler uses a vacation day to travel through North Carolina to the state of
her final destination. So Spivack’s expansive definition of trust income is
untethered from the actual statutes, case law, or precedent. Even so, the
conceptual possibility that a broader range of benefits could be defined as
trust income forces any dialogue about trusts and taxation to confront the
questions about the purpose and implementation of any state income tax
regime.
B. The Institutional Approach
Like Professor Spivack, Professor Hemel is skeptical that family trusts
are truly arm’s length arrangements. But where Spivack sees a Court that
is duped by trusts’ “sleight of hand,”183 Hemel sees a Court that knows
exactly what it is doing in declaring North Carolina’s tax unconstitutional
in Kaestner Trust.184 In an essay published the day after the Court’s
180
See generally, e.g., Kathleen Elkins, The 25 Colleges Where Students Go On to Earn
the Most Money, CNBC (May 1, 2018), https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/01/the-collegeswhere-students-go-on-to-earn-the-most-money.html (listing among schools that produce
highest-earning graduates the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Harvard University,
Georgetown and Stanford University); Nick Morrison, World Rankings Show the Best
Universities for Getting a Job, FORBES (Nov. 23, 2016, 6:16 AM), https://www.forbes.com
/sites/nickmorrison/2016/11/23/world-rankings-show-the-best-universities-for-getting-ajob/#3829dfc74879 (evaluating employment statistics from 300 universities and listing
among schools whose graduates are most “appealing” to employers as Stanford University,
the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Columbia University and Princeton University).
181
See, e.g., Anthony C. Infanti, Tax Equity, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1191, 1238 (2008)
(explaining in discussion of social stigmas against LGBT individuals and associated
emotional or mental stress or disorders, “as a natural corollary of its inability to account for
‘psychic’ income, the income tax does not allow for any sort of a ‘psychic’ deduction to
account for the negative mental health effects of discrimination”).
182
Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
183
See Spivack supra note 152, at 68–69.
184
N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213
(2019). See Daniel Hemel, A Constitutional Right to Skirt State Income Tax?, MEDIUM
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decision, Hemel quipped, “It’s a pity that Supreme Court opinions don’t
come with emojis, because this [opinion] just calls out for the winking
face.”185 He criticizes Justice Sotomayor’s opinion for overreliance on the
trustee’s discretion, pointing, as Spivack does, to the grantor’s direction
that the trustee should treat the trust as a “family asset,” and make trust
distributions for the beneficiaries’ milestone expenses like education, a
home purchase, and starting a business.186 Hemel calls Sotomayor’s
reasoning “formalism at its acme,” because “we all know” that the trustee
will make whatever distributions the grantor and the beneficiaries want.187
Unlike Spivack, Hemel focuses on the decision itself to raise
questions pertinent to fundamental constitutional doctrine—the
“institution” of constitutional law—as well as the larger tax law structure—
the “institution” of tax administration. For example, Hemel rhetorically
questions who (or what) suffers from a violation of the Due Process Clause
if North Carolina imposes a tax solely on the basis of a trust beneficiary’s
in-state residence: “Who exactly is suffering the due process violation
here? The court doesn’t bother to say.”188 Pregnant in this question is the
possibility that Hemel suspects that trusts do not have due process rights,
or, if they do, those rights are somehow different (if not less than) the due
process rights afforded to individuals or corporations.189 If so, that would
represent a substantial development in constitutional law doctrine,190 and
(June 22, 2019), https://medium.com/whatever-source-derived/a-constitutional-right-toskirt-state-income-tax-605dc8c42fbc.
185
Hemel, supra note 184.
186
See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
187
Hemel, supra note 184.
188
Id. Later in the essay, Hemel asks whether the due process rights belong to the
trustee or the beneficiaries. Id. This seems to be a distinction without a difference.
Compare Bridget J. Crawford (@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 1:28 PM),
https://twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/status/1142167341352062982 (“State tax laws must
meet the requirements of the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. Who was North
Carolina trying to tax? The trust. Non-grantor irrevocable trusts are distinct taxpaying
entities for state and fed purposes.
No news there.”) with Daniel J. Hemel
(@DanielJHemel), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 1:37 PM) https://twitter.com/DanielJHemel/sta
tus/1142169768499306497 (“So it was the irrevocable trust’s due process rights that were
being violated? (The fact that they are distinct taxpaying entities is not the same as saying
they are persons for purposes of the due process clause.)”) and Bridget J. Crawford
(@ProfBCrawford), TWITTER (June 21, 2019, 1:41PM), https://twitter.com/ProfBCrawford/
status/1142170727002624000 (“‘Person’ vs non-person does no work in this argument. Is
there a sufficient degree of enjoyment, etc. by beneficiary to permit trust to be taxed? The
system must meet requirements of due process. Any person or entity subject to taxation has
right to due process.”)
189
An individual defendant domiciled in a state can be haled into courts there. See
generally Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S. 117 (2014). A corporate defendant
incorporated in a state or doing business in that state are subject to the jurisdiction of courts
there, too. See generally id.
190
See, e.g., United States v. Morrison, 596 F. Supp. 2d 661 (E.D.N.Y. 2009)
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Hemel rightfully wishes the court had been clearer on this point.
Hemel’s general skepticism about family trusts leads to bleak
predictions about the impacts of the Court’s decision. He forecasts that
states that presently do impose income tax on trusts will need to experiment
with a variety of tax options, such as new gift taxes or an imperfect throwback tax on trust income.191 Hemel’s concerns about the tax landscape are
grounded in the practical (he touches on the complexity of a throw-back
tax). He further warns that Sotomayor’s opinion provides a blueprint for
future strategic behavior by taxpayers:
If you’re a rich person in a high-tax state, the path forward is
quite clear. Transfer income-generating assets to an irrevocable
trust in a state that does not tax trust income on the basis of
trustee residence or place of administration. . . . [I]ncome
generated by the trust now lies beyond the reach of tax
authorities in your home state. Choose a reputable trustee and
give her nominal discretion over the timing of distributions. . . .
[T]he income generated by the trust lies beyond the reach of tax
authorities in your beneficiary’s home state too.192
Practically speaking, however, the nature of the federal system is that each
state is free to structure its laws, including its tax laws, in any way that it
chooses, as long as those laws do not conflict with the U.S. Constitution.193
In such a system, it is inevitable that wealthy (and even less wealthy)
individuals will exploit differences in state tax laws so as to minimize, or
even avoid, taxation.194 There seems to be a general tolerance for taxpayers
(recognizing due process rights for an individual in state taxation matter); Borden Chemicals
and Plastics, L.P. v. Zehnder, 726 N.E.2d 73 (Ill. App. 2000) (recognizing due process
rights for a partnership’s out-of-state partner in a state taxation matters); Dept. of Revenue
v. GAP (Apparel), Inc., 886 So. 2d 459 (La. Ct. App. 2004) (recognizing due process rights
for an intangible holding company in a state taxation matters); Am. Chicle Co. v. State Tax
Comm’n, 11 A.D.2d 256 (N.Y. App. Div. 1960) (recognizing due process rights of a
corporation in a state taxation matter).
191
Hemel, supra note 184.
192
Id. at
193
See, e.g., Bell’s Gap R.R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 134 U.S. 232, 237 (1890) (Nothing
prevents a state “from adjusting its system of taxation in all proper and reasonable ways. It
may, if it chooses, exempt certain classes of property from any taxation at all . . . All such
regulations, and those of like character, so long as they proceed within reasonable limits and
general usage, are within the discretion of the state legislature, or the people of the State in
framing their Constitution.”). See also Gerald L. Neuman, Equal Protection, “General
Equality” and Economic Discrimination from a U.S. Perspective, 5 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 281,
300–08 (1999) (discussing constitutional limitations on differences in U.S. state tax
systems).
194
Tax-motivated domicile changes are the topic of many publicly available articles
written for the general public. See, e.g., Julie Garber, 5 Good Reason to Become a Florida
Resident, BALANCE (May 20, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/top-reasons-to-become-aflorida-resident-3505072 (stating that combined state income tax and estate tax rates “can
provide a huge incentive for individuals to look for a more desirable and less taxing place to

CRAWFORD (DO NOT DELETE)

322

11/14/2019 6:37 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:289

who cross state lines to buy tax-free liquor, for example,195 and those
retirees who move to states with low (or no) income or estate taxes.196
What is important about Hemel’s contribution, then, is that it provides an
example of the strong negative reaction to similar tax-motivated behavior,
when undertaken by wealthy individuals who create family trusts.197 The
strength of that reaction suggests an underlying moral or philosophical
dimension to the critique.198 Tax and trust scholars may turn more
explicitly to moral and philosophical concerns in future work.199
Hemel ends his essay with distinct awareness of the expressive value
of Supreme Court opinions. He describes Kaestner Trust as a ruling that
will cause more than lost revenue for North Carolina and other states:
Will [Kaestner Trust] go down as part of the anti-canon of the
worst Supreme Court decisions ever? Of course not. But when
the history of our second Gilded Age is written, Kaestner will
warrant a plaintive footnote—an illustration that in an era of
already-too-wide wealth inequality, concerns about high-end tax

call home like Florida,” and explaining that Florida has no income tax, no estate tax and a
generous homestead exemption”).
195
See, e.g., Kara Newman, How New Hampshire’s Liquor Stores Became Must-Visit
Travel Destinations, SEVEN FIFTY DAILY (Dec. 18, 2017), https://daily.sevenfifty.com/hownew-hampshires-liquor-stores-became-must-visit-travel-destinations/ (“New Hampshire is
also the only control state that operates liquor stores—and sells that liquor tax free. That
means that New Hampshire draws a significant amount of out-of-state business. It’s an
unusual business model. More than half of sales at these gargantuan retailers comes from
out-of-state-customers. . . .”).
196
Compare, e.g., Sandra Block et al., 10 Most Tax-Friendly States for Retirees, 2018,
KIPLINGER (Nov. 29, 2018), https://www.kiplinger.com/slideshow/retirement/T037-S00110-most-tax-friendly-states-for-retirees-2018/index.html (ranking Alaska as the most “taxfriendly state” for retirees because of absence of state income tax and estate tax and low
state and local sales tax rates), with The Top 10 Most Tax-Friendly States for Retirement,
RETIREMENT LIVING (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.retirementliving.com/top-10-most-taxfriendly-states (ranking Wyoming as the most “tax-friendly state” for retirees because of the
absence of state income and estate tax, low state and local sales tax rates, and low gas tax
rates).
197
See Hemel, supra note 184.
198
See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
199
For excellent extant work exploring philosophical perspectives in wealth transfers,
see, e.g., Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Why Tax Wealth Transfers: A Philosophical Analysis, 57
B.C. L. REV. 859 (2016); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Utilitarianism and Wealth Transfer
Taxation, 69 ARK. L. REV. 695 (2016); Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Unseating Privilege: Rawls,
Equality of Opportunity, and Wealth Transfer Taxation, 59 WAYNE L. REV. 713 (2013);
Jennifer Bird-Pollan, Death, Taxes, and Property (Rights): Nozick, Libertarianism, and the
Estate Tax, 66 ME. L. REV. 1 (2013); Miranda Perry Fleischer, Libertarianism and the
Charitable Tax Subsidies, 56 B.C. L. REV. 1345 (2015); Miranda Perry Fleischer,
Charitable Giving and Utilitarianism: Problems and Priorities, 89 IND. L.J. 1485 (2014);
Miranda Perry Fleischer, Theorizing the Charitable Tax Subsidies: The Role of Distributive
Justice, 87 WASH. U. L. REV. 505 (2010).
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avoidance elicited from the justices little more than a shrug.200
The image of the justices giving “little more than a shrug” in response to
behavior that helps rich people stay that way is profoundly evocative. In
reading Hemel’s description of the present era “our second Gilded Age,”
one immediately recalls that the wealth gap in 2012 was not that different
from the wealth gap just before the great stock market crash in 1929, and
that the wealth gap has widened since 2012.201 Hemel appreciates both the
historical context of the Court’s decision and present-day wealth
inequalities.202 For both Hemel and Spivack, then, the Kaestner Trust
decision represents the Court’s missed opportunity to do justice.203
Although neither Spivack nor Hemel implies that the judiciary should be
the primary instrument for dismantling complex systems of wealth
inequality, both believe that the Court has a role to play and that it failed to
do its duty in this case.
C. Themes in Critical Academic Analyses of Trusts
Like Spivack and Hemel, most academics tend to be critical of family
trusts. There seems to be a general distaste for transfers of “partial bundles
of sticks” to trustees for beneficiaries who otherwise possess the full legal
capacity to own property.204 The concerns tend to cluster into three general
categories: taxes, control, and accountability.
Critics’ tax concerns manifest in noting that, with careful planning,
legal and equitable title split might result in trust assets being subject to no
income tax at all.205 Furthermore, trusts unconstrained by the rule against
perpetuities can escape the estate tax entirely.206 This runs counter to the
intuition that all property belongs to someone, and thus should be
susceptible to taxation at all points in time.207
200
201
202
203

Hemel, supra note 184.
See supra notes 38–39 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.
See Spivack, supra note 152, at 68–69; Hemel, supra note 184 and accompanying

text.
204

See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford, Who Is Afraid of Perpetual Trusts?, 111 MICH. L.
REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 79, 79 (2012) (“Throw a stone into a room full of law professors,
and it is virtually impossible to hit someone who will defend perpetual trusts.”).
205
See Hemel, supra note 184 and accompanying text.
206
See, e.g., Jesse Dukeminier & James E. Krier, The Rise of the Perpetual Trust, 50
UCLA L. REV. 1303, 1342 (2003) (explaining how perpetual trusts are not subject to estate
taxation); Jeramie J. Fortenberry, Use Dynasty Trusts for Multigenerational Wealth
Transfers, 44 EST. PLAN. 35 (2017) (providing overview of dynasty trusts). See also Jay A.
Soled, Reimagining the Estate Tax in the Automation Era, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 787, 820–
21 (explaining objections to so-called perpetual trusts as relating to opportunities for
“taxpayer exploitation” and tax avoidance).
207
See Jacques, supra note 8 (explaining the “liberal understanding of private property”
as having a political dimension, characterized by the belief that “people have an equal right
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Control concerns stem from multiple aspects of substantive trust law.
One strain of critique evocatively focuses on the need for time limits on
“dead hand control” by a grantor long gone.208 Some period of time in
which a grantor’s wishes may govern trust property seems to be acceptable.
That time period typically is the common law perpetuities period that law
students and scholars have come to grudgingly accept as justified (with the
traditional rationale that a property owner rightfully may condition the use
of property for those he knows personally—typically his children and their
children—but the control must end after the infamous period of lives in
being plus twenty-one years).209
The other strain of the control critique, raised separately or together
with first, is that family trusts are somehow not “real.” The argument is
that any legal and equitable title split in a family trust is illusory, and the
trustee is a mere (paper) figure-head who poses no meaningful obstacle to
the beneficiary’s enjoyment of the trust property.210 The flipside of this
critique relies on an opposite view on the trustee, one that emphasizes the
trustee’s power, not the trustee’s de facto impotence when presented with
the wishes of the grantor or beneficiaries.211 Consider in particular that
under a state’s decanting statute, trustees may have the ability change the
situs, term or beneficial interest in trusts by exercise of their decanting

to pursue their aims in life, from which follows a corresponding equal right to acquire the
resources that will enable them to pursue these aims,” as well as the legal dimension driven
by “the right to control things in accordance with one’s interests as well as the right to deny
others the use of these things” in furtherance of individual autonomy).
208
See, e.g., Ray Madoff, America Builds an Aristocracy, N.Y. TIMES (July 11, 2010),
https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/12/opinion/12madoff.html (critiquing long-term trusts as
contributing to inappropriate preservation of wealth).
209
In adjudicating the dispute in the Duke of Norfolk’s Case, (1682) 22 Eng. Rep. 931
(Ch.); 3 Chan. Cas.1, the judge recognized the right of the pater familias to make decisions
regarding the transmission of some, all or no property rights to those he knew. Id. The
English lawyer and judge Arthur Hobhouse, First Baron Hobhouse, famously wrote that, “A
clear, obvious, natural line is drawn for us between those persons and events which the
Settlor knows and sees, and those which he cannot know or see. Within the former province
we may trust his natural affections and his capacity of judgment to make better dispositions
than any external Law . . . .” Arthur Hobhouse, The Devolution and Transfer of Land, in
THE DEAD HAND: ADDRESSES ON THE SUBJECT OF ENDOWMENTS AND SETTLEMENTS OF
PROPERTY 188 (1880). For a contemporary critique of perpetual trusts, see, e.g., Mark L.
Ascher, But I Thought the Earth Belonged to the Living, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1149, 1160 (2011)
(calling long-term trusts “loony”).
210
See, e.g., Cmm’r of Internal Revenue v. Indianapolis Power & Light Co., 493 U.S.
203, 207–08 (1990); Spivak supra note 152, at 49; Hemel, supra note 184 and
accompanying text.
211
See Weisbord, supra note 72 (exploring the contours and limitations of a trustee’s
decanting powers); Alex Boni-Saenz, Baselines in Trust Term Extensions, 67 FLA. L. REV.
F. 30 (2015) (calling trustees’ exercise of decanting power to extend duration of trust “the
next battleground in the rancorous war over the Rule Against Perpetuities”).
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powers.212 This powerful trustee is quite the opposite of trustee-asfigurehead. In this view, the trustee plays a highly determinative role in
shaping beneficial interests.213
Commentators’ accountability concerns center on the rights of third
parties. Spendthrift trusts, critics claim, allow beneficiaries to behave
irresponsibly without financial consequences, because they become
judgment-proof against claims by tort victims or other creditors, like
divorcing spouses.214 Critics reserve particular distaste for self-settled asset
protection trusts created in U.S. jurisdictions; they do so without full
practical appreciation for the attractiveness of offshore jurisdictions, not to
mention potential lost tax revenue, if such trusts became unavailable in this
country.215
One nineteenth century Pennsylvania judge opined that, “Whoever
has the right to give, has the right to dispose of the same as he pleases.”216
One predicts that most academics would agree, in the sense that any
individual property owner has the authority to choose the individual
recipient of a post-mortem gift of a particular heirloom, for example, or
that the owner could choose to destroy the heirloom during her lifetime if
she so desires. But when evaluating transfers to a trust for oneself or one’s
family members, there is little tolerance for arrangements that result in no
liability for income or estate tax,217 limited (or no) liability for bad acts,218
or limitations on a jurisdiction’s ability to hale a trust grantor or beneficiary
into court, if either of them has any contact of any level with the forum
state.219

212

See, e.g., Weisbord, supra note 72, at 76.
See, e.g., id.
214
See, e.g., Spivack, supra note 152, at 48–49, 64–67 (describing cases in which trust
spendthrift clauses deny divorcing spouse the ability to reach assets in trust).
215
See, e.g., Stewart E. Sterk, Asset Protection Trusts: Trust Law’s Race to the
Bottom?, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 1035 (2000) (calling repeal of rule against perpetuities a
“race to the bottom”). Cf. Robert T. Danforth, Rethinking the Law of Creditors’ Rights in
Trusts, 53 HASTINGS L.J. 287 (2002) (articulating possible argument in favor of the selfsettled asset protection trust in terms of the creditors of a trust grantor having no more right
to reach trust property than the grantor could).
216
It sounds better in Latin: “Cujus est dare ejus est disponere.” Ashhurst v. Given, 5
Watts & Serg. 323, 330 (Pa. 1843) (disallowing creditors to reach beneficiary’s interest in
trust based on restrictions placed by grantor).
217
See, e.g., supra note 153 and accompanying text; supra note 207 and accompanying
text; N.C. Dep’t of Revenue v. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Tr., 139 S. Ct. 2213
(2019).
218
See, e.g., supra notes 214–215 and accompanying text.
219
See, e.g., supra note 166–174 and accompanying text.
213
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V. COURTS, TAXES, AND WEALTH CONCENTRATIONS
A. Courts Cannot Solve the Problem of Wealth Inequality
Particularly for wealthy taxpayers, the tax system in the United States
is a cat-and-mouse game.220 The system’s foundations are state and federal
laws (and sometimes local laws, too, as in the case of sales tax), amplified
by the regulations that purport to interpret those laws.221 For most income,
estate, and gift taxes, a taxpayer self-reports the amount of tax owed, and
the government can either accept or reject the return.222 If a conflict arises
between a taxpayer and the government that cannot be resolved
administratively, then a judge will be called upon to interpret and apply the
applicable tax laws in order to end the dispute.223 But courts lack the power
to change the tax laws, unless the laws violate the applicable state
constitution or the U.S. Constitution.224 Until now, critics of the state
220
The vivid (and accurate) description does not originate here; multiple other scholars
and commentators have deployed the metaphor. See, e.g., David Cay Johnston, The
Loophole Artist, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 21, 2003), https://nyti.ms/2UUxxMQ (“[The tax] catand-mouse game is to work the loopholes in the system until the government finds them and
draws them closed.”); Jay A. Soled & Mitchell Gans, Related Parties and the Need to
Bridge the Gap Between the Income Tax and Transfer Tax Systems, 62 ALA. L. REV. 405,
438 (2011) (“Congress should not approach transfer tax reform in a piecemeal fashion . . .
this cat-chasing-mouse process will only result in frustration as clever taxpayers and their
undaunted advisers will continue to formulate and develop new transfer tax-saving
methodologies.”); George K. Yin, Reforming (and Saving) the IRS by Respecting the
Public’s Right to Know, 100 VA. L. REV. 1115, 1155 (2014) (“Since enforcement of the tax
laws is to some extent a cat-and-mouse game, the agency’s ability to use its limited
enforcement resources most efficiently must be preserved.”).
221
See, e.g., Bridget J. Crawford & Carla Spivack, Tampon Taxes, Discrimination and
Human Rights, 2017 WIS. L. REV. 491, 500 (discussing sales tax-free status of medical
supplies and necessities). See also, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 212.08(nnn) (2018) (providing sales
tax exemption for “products used to absorb menstrual flow” defined as “products used to
absorb or contain menstrual flow, including, but not limited to, tampons, sanitary napkins,
pantiliners, and menstrual cups”).
222
For a brief overview of federal income tax procedure, see NEWMAN ET AL., FEDERAL
INCOME TAXATION: CASES, PROBLEMS & MATERIALS 9–10 (7th ed. 2019).
223
Id. (describing judicial pathways of a federal income tax case).
224
Relevant limitations in the U.S. Constitution include, for example, the Due Process
Clause and the Commerce Clause. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (prohibiting state from
state depriving any person “of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law”); U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8 (reserving to Congress the right to regulate commerce “among the several
states”). Although some provisions of state constitutions may mirror, overlap with, or be
interpreted similarly to their federal counterparts, that is not always true. See, e.g., Aileen
H. Char Life Interest v. Maricopa County, 93 P.3d 486 (Ariz. 2004) (interpreting the state
constitution’s Uniformity Clause, Ariz. Const. art. IX, § 1, to provide taxpayers with greater
protection than the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution). Also, distinguish between a court’s ability to declare that a law is
unconstitutional (i.e., unenforceable) with the ability to change the law. See, e.g., Eric S.
Fish, Choosing Constitutional Remedies, 63 UCLA L. REV. 322, 324–25, 380–81 (2016)
(distinguishing between declaring law unconstitutional versus changing legislative content,
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income taxation of trusts, or even trusts in general, have tended to use
scholarly articles and amicus briefs to make technical arguments against
family trusts.225 But if loopholes in state laws permit family trusts to
flourish inappropriately, state legislatures, not the courts, are likely the
most effective source of reform.226
At their core, trusts are creations of legal fiction, to be sure.227 But
legal decisions over centuries have recognized trusts, including their split
of legal and equitable title, as valid.228 To the extent that trust law has
changed dramatically in the last twenty-five years, the transformation is the
result of state-by-state legislation.229 Proposals for reform have come from
national organizations such as the American Law Institute and the Uniform
Law Commission, as well as individuals and groups—typically local
lawyers, bankers, and their professional associations—in each state.230 As
while also noting that “in cases where the existing law is unconstitutional, the court must
generally make a change that will either expand or contract the law”). See also Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, Address, Some Thoughts on Judicial Authority to Repair Unconstitutional
Legislation, 28 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301, 317 (1979) (“When the court passes on the
constitutionality of a statute . . . it concludes its essentially judicial business. If it declares
the statute unconstitutional as written, the remaining task is essentially legislative.”).
225
See supra notes 149–150 and accompanying text and supra Parts IV.A and B.
226
Undoubtedly, the focus on the production of scholarly articles makes sense, given
that most tenured and tenure-track faculty members are expected to produce scholarship as
part of their jobs. See, e.g., College of Law Tenure Standards and Procedures, UNIVERSITY
OF IOWA COLLEGE OF LAW (2009), https://uiowa.edu/conflictmanagement/sites/uiowa.edu.co
nflictmanagement/files/Law.pdf (“[E]very faculty member is expected to engage in the
study of and critical evaluation of some aspects of the legal system. It is also expected that
the fruits of this inquiry will result in scholarly publications.”). Furthermore, one suspects
that there are far more law professors who are familiar with amicus briefs (from their
experiences as judicial clerks) than there are law professors who have experience with state
or federal legislative lobbying. See, e.g, Sarah Lawsky, Spring Self-Reported Entry Level
Hiring Report 2019, PRAWFSBLAWG (June 4, 2019), https://prawfsblawg.blogs.com/prawfsbl
awg/2019/06/spring-self-reported-entry-level-hiring-report-2019.html (showing 63% of all
self-reported recent law school faculty hires held a clerkship prior to accepting their faculty
position, but not gathering data about legislative lobbying experience). This is not to say
that law faculty are not involved at the state or national levels on law reform projects. See,
e.g., Electronic Wills Act, Draft for Discussion, UNIF. LAW COMM’N (Feb. 12, 2019),
https://tinyurl.com/y3pufoj5 (listing Professor Susan Gary of the University of Oregon
School of Law as the Committee’s Reporter).
227
See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
228
See supra notes 7–8 and accompanying text.
229
See Crawford, supra note 13, at 81–82 (“In the case of trusts that are designed to
keep rich people rich, three very curious things have happened in the United States in the
last twenty-five years. These have revolutionized trust law more than anything else in the
last 400 years: the rise of self-settled asset protection trusts, the proliferation of trust
decanting rules and the repeal of the rule against perpetuities in over half of the jurisdictions
in the nation.”) (citations omitted).
230
This is what Robert Sitkoff calls the “top-down versus bottom-up” model of reform,
with proposals from American Law Institute and the Uniform Law Commission typically
intended “to update the law in accord with emerging academic and elite practitioner policy
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with state income tax laws, once the legislature enacts a provision,
generally speaking a court must find a violation of the state constitution,
the U.S. Constitution, or perhaps public policy, in order to change it.231 For
that reason, courts are ill-equipped to play a role in dismantling wealth
inequality through interpretation of income tax laws or trust laws.
B. Taxes Could Solve the Problem of Wealth Inequality
Given the wealth inequality in this country, one naturally turns to the
estate tax as a possible remedy. After all, Congress enacted the estate tax
in 1916,232 motivated by the need to raise revenue during the first world
war and to address rising wealth inequality.233 Unfortunately, however, the
country’s past and existing iterations of the estate tax have never raised
much revenue.234 In 2018, estate tax collections represented approximately
consensus on necessary revision to the canon.” Robert Sitkoff, Top-Down Versus BottomUp Law Reform in Trusts and Estates: Future Interests and Perpetuities, JOTWELL (Nov. 22,
2010),
https://trustest.jotwell.com/top-down-versus-bottom-up-law-reform-in-trusts-andestates-future-interests-and-perpetuities. In contrast, “the other law reform pattern, which
we can characterize as bottom-up, local bankers and lawyers lobby state lawmakers for a
specific reform. Bottom-up reforms are usually meant to attract trust business (think
perpetual or asset protection trusts).” Id.
231
There are, of course, exceptions to this general rule, although arguably courts
accomplish legal change by choosing to follow or depart from case law precedent
interpreting a statute, rather than attacking the statute itself. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Burkin,
460 N.E.2d 572 (Mass. 1984). In that case, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
addressed the question of whether a revocable inter vivos trust created by a husband was
subject to the widow’s elective share right. Id. A prior decision had interpreted the elective
share statute to apply to only probate property. See Kerwin v. Donaghy, 59 N.E.2d 299
(Mass. 1945). In Sullivan, the court announced that “for the future . . . as to any inter vivos
trust created or amended after the date of this opinion, we shall no longer follow the rule
announced in Kerwin v. Donaghy.” Sullivan, 460 N.E.2d at 577. Practically speaking, that
meant that the court prospectively expanded the elective share right of a surviving spouse,
even though the statute did not change. See id.
232
An Act to Increase the Revenue, and for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 64-271, § 1, 39
Stat. 756, 756–57 (1916).
233
See Jeffrey A. Cooper, The Ghosts of 1932: The Lost History of Estate and Gift
Taxation, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 875, 882 (2010) (“In 1916, Congress again turned to estate taxes
to fund another looming military conflict, enacting a new estate tax just prior to U.S. entry
into World War I.”); WILLIAM H. GATES, SR. & CHUCK COLLINS, WEALTH AND OUR
COMMONWEALTH: WHY AMERICA SHOULD TAX ACCUMULATED FORTUNES 41 (2002) (“Early
in the twentieth century, Gilded Age corruption and inequality, powerful and popular social
movements, and growing moral misgivings within the wealthy elite all converged on
America’s political stage. Out of that convergence came America’s first lasting estate
tax.”); PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 440 (“[T]his fear of growing to resemble Europe was part
of the reason why the United States in 1910–1920 pioneered a very progressive estate tax on
large fortunes, which were deemed to be incompatible with US values . . . .”).
234
See generally James R. Repetti, Should We Tax the Gratuitous Transfer of Wealth?
An Introduction, 57 B.C. L. REV. 815, 815 (2016) (reporting on comparative percentages of
total tax revenue attributable to the estate tax for the period 1981 through 2014 ranging from
an approximate high of 1.2% to a low 0.65%).
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0.65% of total tax revenue.235 Given the generous wealth transfer tax
exemption (in 2019, $11.4 million per person or $22.8 million per
couple),236 the number of estates subject to taxation is necessarily small.237
The current wealth transfer framework of high exemptions and
relatively low tax rates has not been constant throughout the estate tax’s
history, however.238 For example, for the period September 1, 1936
through June 25, 1945, net estates valued at more than ten million dollars
were subject to taxation at a rate of seventy percent.239 For the period 1977
through 1981, that same top rate of seventy percent applied to estates
valued at more five million dollars.240 Only after President George W.
Bush signed into law the Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act of 2001 did estate tax rates start steadily declining substantially
downward, while the wealth transfer tax exemption amount trended
steadily upward.241
Although there is historical precedent for higher rates of taxation,242
making only modifications to rates or exemptions may not be enough to
make a meaningful change to the wealth gap. France, for example, has a
more robust estate tax system than the United States does, with a top rate of
forty-five percent.243 In France, the rate of wealth inequality is still high
235

See INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2018, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. 14,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/18databk.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019) (see Table 6).
236
See Rev. Proc. 2018-57 (announcing inflation-adjusted figures applicable for tax
year 2019); 26 U.S.C. § 2010(c) (2018), amended by Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L.
No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (increasing wealth transfer tax exemption in 2018 to $11.18 per
person, indexed for inflation).
237
Compare INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA BOOK 2018, supra note 235, at Table 2
(showing 34,092 estate tax returns filed for 2018) with INTERNAL REVENUE SERV. DATA
BOOK 2009, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf (last
visited Oct. 4, 2019) (see Table 2) (showing 46,000 estate tax returns filed for 2009).
Practically speaking, the high exemptions mean that only approximately 0.1% of decedents’
estates are subject to estate taxation each year. See, e.g., Julie Garber, Federal Estate Tax
Exemptions 1997 Through 2019, BALANCE (July 9, 2019), https://www.thebalance.com/exe
mption-from-federal-estate-taxes-3505630 (providing overview of operation and amount of
exemption from federal estate and gift taxes).
238
See supra note 236 and accompanying text (furnishing wealth transfer tax exemption
figures for 2019 of $11.4 million per individual and $22.8 million for per married couple).
239
See, e.g., A Historical Look at Estate and Gift Tax Rates, CCH,
https://www.cch.com/press/news/historicalestategifttaxrates.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2019)
(providing maximum estate tax rates for years 1916 through 2011).
240
Id. at
241
H.R. 1836, 107th Cong. (1st Sess. 2001).
242
See supra note 236 and accompanying text; supra note 238 and accompanying text;
supra note 239 and accompanying text.
243
See, e.g., Alan Cole, Estate and Inheritance Taxes Around the World, TAX FOUND.
(2015), https://taxfoundation.org/estate-and-inheritance-taxes-around-world (providing data
on highest estate and inheritance tax rates in thirty-four countries); Jean-Marc Tirard &
Maryse Naudin, Private Client Law in France: Overview, WESTLAW.COM (Dec. 1, 2017),

CRAWFORD (DO NOT DELETE)

330

11/14/2019 6:37 PM

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 50:289

(although lower than the rate of inequality in the United States), with the
top ten percent of all households owning approximately sixty-two percent
of all of the country’s wealth.244 This suggests that higher tax rates do have
some impact on wealth inequality, but query how high the rate would have
to go (and how low the exemption would need to be set) to see similar (or
better) results in the United States compared to France, for example.245
Even short of imposing estate tax at near-confiscatory rates, it is far
from obvious that the majority of the American electorate would support
broad-reaching changes to the present system of taxing transfers of wealth
during lifetime or at death.246 According to a recent poll conducted for the
New York Times, two-thirds of all Americans (including fifty-five percent
of self-identified Republicans and sixty-six percent of self-identified
Independents) support a two percent tax on households having more than
fifty million dollars of wealth.247 At the same time, however, rank-and-file
Democratic voters express concern that sweeping change, like the wealth
tax they overwhelmingly support when polled, might not be practical.
Some of these voters report that they worry that proposals like the two
percent wealth tax are too “radical” to receive support in the general
election, and that in order to increase the chance that a Democrat will be
elected as President, any candidate should take a more incremental
approach to tax (and other) reform.248
If significant estate tax reform or a wealth taxes are not viable nearterm strategies for combatting wealth inequality, consider instead the
https://tinyurl.com/y6zjfkoj (providing overview of taxes in inheritances and lifetime
transfers); Jacques, supra note 8.
244
PIKETTY, supra note 38, at 430 (showing historic changes in top decile’s share of
country’s total wealth).
245
Professor Jim Repetti suggests that it is far from obvious that any version of the U.S.
estate tax system has, in fact, been effective in breaking up concentrations of wealth. See,
e.g., Repetti, supra note 234 (reporting low percentages of revenue generated by estate tax).
246
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & IAN SHAPIRO, DEATH BY A THOUSAND CUTS: THE
FIGHT OVER TAXING INHERITED WEALTH 6–7 (2006) (describing inaccurate yet effective
deployment of the phrase “death tax” in marshalling opposition to the estate tax).
247
See, e.g., Jim Tankersley & Benn Casselman, Wealth Tax and Free College Get Poll
Support, N.Y. TIMES (July 21, 2019), https://nyti.ms/2YYTCwh (showing overall support
for the wealth tax at a rate of sixty-sixty percent, with the level of support among selfidentified Democrats at eighty-one percent). See also Matthew Yglesias, Elizabeth
Warren’s Proposed Tax on Enormous Fortunes, Explained, VOX (Jan. 24, 2019),
https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2019/1/24/18196275/elizabeth-warren-wealth-tax
(describing for a general audience Senator Warren’s proposal for a 2% tax on households
with over fifty million dollars in wealth, projected to raise $2.75 trillion in ten years).
248
See Tankersley & Casselman, supra note 247 (“Polls show several of those ideas [of
Democratic presidential hopefuls] are quite popular with the electorate, including taxing the
assets of very wealthy Americans . . . But Democratic voters . . . worry that the popularity of
the proposals will fade before next year’s general election and become a liability for their
party’s nominee.”).
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possibility of income tax reform. In the past, the income tax rate has been
as high as ninety-four percent.249 Because it may not be politically feasible
to return income tax rates to such a high level,250 some critics of wealth
inequality have suggested revising the existing income tax rules so as to
treat gifts, bequests, and devises as income to the beneficiary.251 Adopting
this rule would mean abandoning the step-up in basis rule under Section
1014 (which provides that the donee takes a basis in the property equal to
the fair market value of the property as of the decedent’s date of death or as
of the alternate valuation date) and the implementing a carry-over basis
regime under Section 1015 (which provides that the donee takes the
donor’s basis).252 The country’s two prior experiments with carry-over
basis were unsuccessful, but that does not mean that an updated version of
a similar proposal should be off-limits.253 There have been many
249
See U.S. Federal Individual Income Tax Rates History, 1862-2013 (Nominal and
Inflation-Adjusted Brackets), TAX FOUND. (Oct. 17, 2013), http://taxfoundation.org/article/
us-federal-individual-income-tax-rates-history-1913-2013-nominal-and-inflation-adjustedbrackets (showing rate of 94% in 1945 and above 90% from 1946 until 1963). See also
Tracey M. Roberts, Brackets: A Historical Perspective, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 925 (2014)
(surveying graduated income tax rate structure from 1913 to 2013).
250
In January 2019, Representative Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez (D-NY) proposed a
highest marginal tax rate of 70% applicable to those earning $10 million or more. See, e.g.,
Howard Gleckman, About Rep. Ocasio-Cortez’s 70 Percent Tax Rates, TAX POL’Y CTR.
(Jan. 8, 2019), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/about-rep-ocasio-cortezs-70-percenttax-rates (explaining that Representative Ocasio-Cortez proposed a marginal—not
average—tax rate of seventy percent). A poll shows that approximately 59% of all
registered voters support the proposal, including 60% of Republicans and 71% of
Democrats. See, e.g., Steve Goldstein, Poll Finds Broad Support for Occasion Cortez’s
70% Top-Tax-Rate Proposal, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 15, 2019), https://www.marketwatch.co
m/story/poll-finds-broad-support-for-ocasio-cortezs-70-top-tax-rate-proposal-2019-01-15.
The proposal may be rhetorically appealing but it is not likely comprehensive enough for
some Democrats. See, e.g., Monica Prasad, Actually, It Was Democrats Who Killed the 70
Percent Tax, POLITICO (Feb. 5, 2019), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2019/02/05/
democrats-70-percent-tax-rate-000879 (“Pushing the capital gains tax modestly upward
might not have the same emotional appeal to progressives as raising the top tax rate to a
theatrical number like 70 percent, but it is critical to generating revenue.”). Some
Republicans have simply misinterpreted the proposal. See, e.g., Gleckman, supra.
251
This is something that Professor Joseph Dodge, for one, has been advocating for over
forty years. See, e.g., Joseph M. Dodge, Beyond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including
Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1177 (1978).
252
26 U.S.C.A. §§ 1014, 1015 (West 2018). See generally Karen C. Burke & Grayson
M.P. McCouch, Estate Tax Repeal: Through the Looking Glass, 22 VA. TAX. REV. 187
(2002) (explaining carryover basis system’s operation and challenges).
253
See, e.g., Marc S. Bekerman & William P. LaPiana, Carryover Have We Features,
19 PROB. & PROP. 38 (2005) (describing first proposed carryover basis law in 1976 as “so
unsuccessful that it was repealed retroactively shortly after passage”); Grayson M.P.
McCouch, The Empty Promise of Estate Tax Repeal, 28 VA. TAX REV. 369, 383 (2008)
(critiquing carryover basis because it “inherently allows taxpayers who inherit appreciated
property to defer paying tax on the unrealized gain until they sell the property. In this
context, deferral is equivalent to a reduction in the rate of tax on capital gains; the longer the
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thoughtful scholarly proposals to address wealth inequality through income
tax reform.254 Such reform in fact might be able to accomplish a reduction
in the wealth gap. The complexities of income tax reform are beyond the
scope of this Article, however.255 Instead, the next Part considers a new
possible focus for concerns about wealth inequality: revisions to the
substantive law of trusts.
VI. TRUSTS IN A MAGICAL WORLD
Courts lack the institutional capacity to meaningfully change state
income tax laws or substantive state laws governing trusts.256 The federal
estate tax system is not especially effective in its current form, and it is not
obvious that there is political will to transform it.257 There are thoughtful
ways that the federal income tax system could more effectively treat
accessions to personal wealth.258 What has received less attention is how
the law of trusts could be changed with the explicit goal of reducing wealth
inequality. A careful unpacking of the critiques of the Kaestner Trust case
in particular, as well as family trusts in general,259 prompts the question of
whether limiting the use of trusts—or even eliminating them altogether—
might be one way to address the wealth gap. This Part briefly (and
reluctantly) brackets tax reform out of the analysis to imagine a new legal
landscape for trusts.260
First, envision a system in which the only allowable trusts were for
those who lack the legal capacity to manage money for themselves. This
would limit the universe of trust beneficiaries largely to minors and those
who have been declared legally incompetent. If a senior generation family
member wants to transfer assets to a younger generation family member
who has the legal capacity to own assets, but the intended donee lacks
financial savvy, the younger family member will have to hire someone to
manage the assets. In this iteration of an altered trust landscape, there
deferral period, the lower the effective tax rate.”).
254
Other law professors have advanced well-reasoned proposals for estate tax reform.
See, e.g., Miranda Perry Fleischer, Divide and Conquer: Using an Accessions Tax to
Combat Dynastic Wealth Transfers, 57 B.C. L. REV. 913 (2016); Joseph M. Dodge,
Replacing the Estate Tax with a Reimagined Accessions Tax, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 997 (2009).
255
For a powerful argument in favor of a focus in income tax reform to address wealth
inequality, see, e.g., Edward J. McCaffery, Distracted from Distraction by Distraction:
Reimagining Estate Tax Reform, 40 PEPP. L. REV. 1235, 1253 (2013) (arguing for
abandoning the estate tax in favor of “a consistent progressive consumption, or equivalently,
a cash-flow spending tax”).
256
See supra Part V.A.
257
See supra Part V.B.
258
Id. See also McCaffery, supra note 255.
259
See supra Part IV.
260
See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
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could be no special needs trusts for beneficiaries with disabilities, as long
as they have the technical legal capacity to hold property. A parent
therefore would have to choose between disinheriting an adult child who is
physically disabled, but has full mental capacity, or leaving assets outright
to the adult child, for example. If the parent does the latter, the adult child
initially would not be eligible for governmental benefits to assist with
needs arising from the disability. The adult child would have to consume
all of the parent’s bequest first.
A second feature of an alternate trust universe could be a limitation on
the duration of any trust to the lifetime of a named individual who is alive
at the time of the trust creation. Upon that individual’s death, the assets
could vest in say, a particular beneficiary’s estate, or pass outright to
someone else entirely. Some dead hand control would be tolerated, but for
only one lifetime. There would be zero possibility that assets could pass
tax free successively down the generations.
A third option, to be deployed alone or in connection with other
features, could be eliminating spendthrift clauses.261 A beneficiary would
have no protection, then, against voluntary or involuntary creditors.
Presumably, this would encourage responsible and prudent behavior by the
beneficiary, but even the most morally faultless beneficiary could not
shield assets if legally responsible for causing harm to another. In this
world, beneficiaries with drug addictions or imprudent spending habits
would soon be parted from their funds.
A fourth possibility in the imagined new trust world could be to
permit family trusts, but to limit the amount of money that can be held in
all trusts for any beneficiary, akin to the cap on funds that can be held for
one individual in college tuition savings programs, also known as “529
plans.”262 Every time a grantor creates a trust, the trust would have to
register with the state or federal government, and the trustee would be
required to make annual reports of the assets under management. The
government would confiscate any amounts over the financial limit. The
limit could be set at, say, the individual wealth transfer tax exemption of
$11.4 million (in 2019).263 A drawback to this feature, however, is it could
261
This approach would be more consistent with English law, which generally does not
recognize spendthrift trusts. See Gregory S. Alexander, The Dead Hand and the Law of
Trusts in the Nineteenth Century, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1198–99 (1985).
262
The limits depend on the particulars of the state that sponsors the plan. See, e.g.,
Kathryn Flynn, How Much Can You Contribute to a 529 Plan in 2019?, SAVING FOR
COLLEGE (Feb. 12, 2019), https://www.savingforcollege.com/article/how-much-can-youcontribute-to-a-529-plan (“Limits vary by state, ranging from $235,000 to $529,000. This
amount represents what the state believes to be the full cost of attending an expensive
school and graduate school, including textbooks and room and board.”).
263
See supra note 236 (announcing individual wealth transfer tax exemption, indexed
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have the unintended consequence of causing trustees to invest in an overly
conservative manner, something that twentieth-century trust reformers
recognized as a long-standing problem and then largely addressed by the
Uniform Prudent Investor Act.264 The Uniform Act explicitly permits the
trustee to make any investment a prudent investor would “by considering
the purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of
the trust,” without fear that an under-performing asset will cause the trustee
to be deemed to have breached the trustee’s fiduciary duty.265 If a trustee
of a wealth-capped family trust knew that having “too successful”
investments could trigger a financial penalty, the trustee might be
encouraged to invest in assets with minimal growth potential. As an
economic matter, having an entire class of property owners who are not
free in practice to invest in growth assets likely would skew the market
inappropriately. This is hardly a desirable result.
A fifth option, again to be used alone or in conjunction with other
proposals, could be to disallow all self-settled asset protection trusts.
Those U.S. domiciliaries who want to shield their assets from creditors
likely would simply establish a self-settled trust in the Cayman Islands, for
example, and make the money much more difficult for any voluntary or
involuntary creditor to reach, or for any criminal investigator to discover.266
This would have negative consequences for U.S. resident banks and trust
companies that presently maintain such trusts in one of the fifty states (and
the workforces that support the administration of those trusts).
A sixth possible option could be to require that all trustees be banks or
trust companies with no prior relationship with the grantor or any of the
beneficiaries. The grantor would be unable to choose a trusted family

for inflation).
264
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994) (“A trustee
shall invest and manage trust assets as a prudent investor would, by considering the
purposes, terms, distribution requirements, and other circumstances of the trust. In satisfying
this standard, the trustee shall exercise reasonable care, skill, and caution.”). But cf.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 227 (AM. LAW INST. 2007) (under section entitled
“General Standard of Prudent Investment,” requiring trustee to invest trust property “as a
prudent investor would”). Forty-three states, the District of Columbia, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands have adopted the Uniform Prudent Investor Act. See Unif. Prudent Investor Act,
UNIF. L. COMMISSION, https://www.uniformlaws.org/committees/community-home?Commu
nityKey=58f87d0a-3617-4635-a2af-9a4d02d119c9 (last visited Oct. 15, 2019) (listing
jurisdictions that have adopted the law). For a discussion of the Uniform Prudent Investor
Act and its basis in modern portfolio theory, see, e.g., Steward E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust
Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent Investor Doctrine? 95 CORNELL L. REV. 851
(2010).
265
See UNIF. PRUDENT INVESTOR ACT § 2(a) (UNIF. LAW COMM’N 1994).
266
See, e.g., James M. Duggan, The Prudence of Offshore Planning for Affluent Clients,
40 EST. PLAN. 18 (2013) (describing jurisdictional obstacles to reaching assets in a trust
established in a jurisdiction such as Jersey, Bermuda, and the Cayman Islands).
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friend or advisor as trustee. With an institutional “stranger” as trustee,
outside observers would have more confidence that the split of legal and
equitable title represents a meaningful separation of the beneficiary from
the trust property. There could be a further requirement that the only
institutions eligible to act as trustee are those located in jurisdictions that
are certain to tax on the basis of the trustee’s conduct of business in that
jurisdiction. In this scenario, one might see a “race to the top,” a
jurisdictional competition to implement an income tax in states that do not
have one, so that institutions in that jurisdiction could be eligible to serve
as trustees of family trusts.267 But if private individuals were prohibited
from acting as trustees, institutions might raise their fiduciary fees,
knowing that the grantor must select one of them. Some would say that
this is a small price to pay, and one paid by people who can afford it
anyway, for increased public confidence in the integrity of family trusts.
A seventh option could be to eliminate all family trusts. A transfer for
a minor beneficiary would have to be made via the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act, Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, or a formal guardianship.268
Disabled, drug addicted, improvident, or tortfeasing beneficiaries
(intentional or accidental) would be left to their own devices to manage
their assets, hire someone to do so, and—along with donees of family
assets who experience divorce—lose some or all of their money.
Advantages of a no-trust legal landscape would be the absence of doubt
about who pays tax on any income from the assets. As the outright owner,
the beneficiary would be liable for the income tax. And if at the time of the
gift, the beneficiary lived in a state with no income tax, the beneficiary
could be required to move to a jurisdiction that does impose a tax, as a
condition of taking ownership of the gift. If the beneficiary declined to do
so, the property would escheat to the state. Or, instead of requiring the
beneficiary to change domiciles, the property could continue to be taxed to
the transferor (assuming the transferor resided in a jurisdiction with an
income tax). If neither the transferor nor the donee were subject to income
tax, the beneficiary could be required to calculate a tentative annual state
income tax equivalent, at the highest rate imposed by any state, and to pay
that amount to a collective fund devoted to assistance of the poor (without
receiving any income tax charitable contribution deduction for doing so).
Cf. Sterk, supra note 215 (calling repeal of rule against perpetuities a “race to the
bottom”).
268
See, e.g., Cornelius W. Coghill III & Mark B. Edwards, Transfers to Minors: Basic
Techniques, 4 PROB. & PROP. 20 (1990) (explaining different vehicles typically used for
transferring property to minors, and recommending transfers under the Uniform Gifts to
Minors Act or the Uniform Transfers to Minors Act, but discouraging the use of a courtappointed guardian because of restrictions on investments by the guardian, among other
reasons).
267
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Such a proposal likely would be met with widespread disapproval, as it
infringes on personal liberty (i.e., a personal decision about where to live).
It is probably unconstitutional as well. But if critics want to eliminate all
state tax arbitrage loopholes, some sort of universal state income tax or its
equivalent would be a necessary feature of a no-trust landscape (however
unwelcome by those who live in states that impose no income tax).
There are multiple problems with each of these specific options for a
drastically different legal landscape for trusts, and no doubt, there are
countless other ways to reform substantive trust law—separate and apart
from the tax law—and those would have drawbacks, too. The seven
suggestions in this Part are unworkable for many reasons, but each does in
fact address one or more concerns raised by critics of family trusts. To be
sure, these suggestions are an exercise in magical thinking, just as trusts
themselves are the product of magical thinking. So, too, is the hope that
courts will play an active role in dismantling wealth inequality, because
courts are not free, on their own initiative, to disregard hundreds of years of
law that treats trusts as valid property arrangements and the tax laws that
have developed to address trusts.269 But by contemplating unrealistic and
even undesirable changes to trust law, family trusts’ salutary functions may
become clearer.
If the reaction to the seven suggestions is that an alternate legal
landscape with limited (or no) trusts is unfathomable, that reaction can help
pinpoint the contexts in which a critic might tolerate or even encourage
family trusts, notwithstanding the large national wealth gap. Similarly, if
particular limitations or modifications appeal or seem reasonable in some
way, critics of family trusts will be better able to focus on specific
objectionable trust features, without condemning all family trusts.
Dialogue about dialogue might sharpen future dialogue. This may be too
precious a claim. But perhaps not.
VII. CONCLUSION
The development of trust law intertwines with tax-minimization (and
even tax-avoidance) strategies.270 That is a matter of historical fact.271 It is
equally true that trusts are effective management devices to hold property
for the benefit of those whom the grantor has decided, for whatever reason,

269

See Crawford, supra note 13 and accompanying text; Spivak, supra note 152 and
accompanying text.
270
See, e.g., F.W. Maitland, The Origin of Uses, 8 HARV. L. REV. 127, 130 (1894)
(describing thirteenth-century English laws that prevented Franciscan monks from owning
property that gave rise to a wealthy benefactor’s establishment of a use for the benefit of the
order).
271
Id.
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should not own the property outright.272 Common reasons might include
the legal incapacity of the beneficiary (for example, because of age, mental
incapacity, or even sex—proxy for legal incapacity, historically
speaking).273 For hundreds of years, courts and legislators have treated as
entirely valid and legally enforceable the magical thinking that a grantor
splits legal and equitable title by making a transfer to a trustee for the
benefit of one or more beneficiaries.
Theoretically speaking, the law’s respect for trusts is based on the idea
that if a grantor has no obligation to transfer any proverbial bundle of
property-right sticks to a beneficiary, then it is perfectly within the
grantor’s discretion to transfer to the beneficiary less than the entire bundle
of sticks.274 Clever lawyers have developed multiple ways to whittle any
individual stick in that bundle—prohibiting a beneficiary’s creditors from
reaching the trust assets, revising state laws so that trusts can last forever,
and permitting trustees to move assets from one trust to another, for
example.
In the twenty-first century, family trusts frequently contain multiple
clauses that seem designed primarily to protect and preserve eye-popping
levels of wealth. That makes it easy to lose sight of the fact that family
trusts are not per se problematic. Trusts can serve valuable management
functions—such as in the case of trusts for minors or disabled beneficiaries;
or for jointly held or specialized assets—and even appropriately separate a
beneficiary from outright ownership of assets so that a beneficiary will not
become a drain on public resources. So, too, the ability to decant trust
assets into a new trust may facilitate correction of harmless errors in trust
272

Consider again, for example, the infamous Duke of Norfolk’s Case, 22 Eng. Rep. 931

(Ch.).
273
Before the enactment of certain law reforms in the nineteenth century, married
women, for example, could hold property only through separate estate trusts. See, e.g.,
Allison Anna Tait, The Beginning of the End of Coverture: A Reappraisal of the Married
Woman’s Separate Estate, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 165, 167 (2014) (“Although littleknown in modern legal circles, the separate estate was, by and large, the sole form of
married women’s property before statutory enactments granted married women property
rights in the nineteenth century. In its most basic form, a separate estate was any assets put
in trust for a woman, such that it was for her “sole and separate use” and not available to her
husband or his creditors.”).
274
During the early nineteenth century, most U.S. jurisdictions did not recognize
restraints on alienation of beneficial trust interests. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 261, at
1198–99 (1985) (describing development of U.S. jurisprudence). Nevertheless, American
jurisprudence developed in a direction that resulted in the recognition of spendthrift trusts.
See, e.g., Nicholas v. Eaton, 91 U.S. 716, 727 (1875) (expressing in dicta approval for
testator’s wishes “to use his own property in securing the object of his affection, as far as
property can do it, from the ills of life, the vicissitudes of fortune, and even his own
improvidence, or incapacity for self-protection, should not be permitted to do so, is not
readily perceived”); Broadway Bank v. Adams, 133 Mass. 170 (1882) (upholding
spendthrift provision of trust).
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instruments or allow a trustee to relocate a trust to a jurisdiction with more
flexible administrative rules, or allowing a trust to last without a specific
termination date might protect against future beneficiaries’ strategic
behavior or improvidence. But loading trust instruments with so many
provisions that large numbers of ultrawealthy families are almost certain to
stay that way permanently may tip the balance of “traditional notions of
fair play and substantial justice”275 too far in favor of private inurement.
Unless one is willing to abolish trusts entirely (which is both
impractical and unwise), one must engage in a difficult line-drawing
project. It may be possible to achieve quick consensus that sham trusts are
“bad” and that trusts for minors or legally incapacitated people are “good,”
but a vast area lies between the two poles. Engaging in a sincere dialogue
about cases like Kaestner Trust invites interrogation of the role that trusts
play in creating and sustaining inequality. These conversations might
facilitate identification of allies—whether of the “top down” variety, like
members of the American Law Institute or the Uniform Law Commission,
or the “bottom up” kind like local lawyers and bankers276—who appreciate
that wealth inequality is not good for the long-term stability of society.277
Trust law reform can (and should be) made on a state-law level. Our
collective future depends on reducing the wealth gap among all segments
of society.

275
276
277

See Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
See supra note 230.
See supra notes 66–70 and accompanying text.

